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PURPOSE AND SCOPE
Academic writings on conflict of laws frequently consist of earnest
expositions setting forth the author's views as to what the law should be
in a given conflicts area. This legal evangelism provides a vehicle for
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. This article
was prepared in cooperation with the North Carolina Law Center.
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erudition, foments legal cerebration, and on occasion results in a state
supreme court adopting into its conflicts law a principle or principles thus
enunciated. These exhortations to re-evaluate and the resulting re-
examinations of various conflicts problems are valuable and commendable.
However, the legal technician, whether he be lawyer, judge, teacher or
legislator, does well to start from a firm foundation of what the law is
whefi he essays to change that law to make it comport to his views of
what it should be. Further, the present state of the law often has the
support not only of stare decisis but also of reason.
Accordingly, the precise purpose of this article is to present, with
a minimum of embellishment, the North Carolina choice of law conflicts
rules as they actually were on January 1, 1970. Choice of law problems
that have arisen since February 1, 1963, will provide the principal vehicle
for this discussion.
No effort will be made either to flagellate or to laud the court or
the legislature for purported insufficiencies or excellences in their con-
flicts output. Changes, if any are appropriate, are most likely to result
from ingenious advocacy by the bar, judicial wisdom, and legislative
sagacity. The author will endeavor to remember that these meritiorious
jurisprudential qualities are primarily autogenous and are by no means
engendered solely by academic exhortations.'
CONFLICT OF LAws FLEXIBILITY
State courts and legislatures are uniquely free to work out their own
destinies in the area of choice of law rules. A federal or state constitu-
tional restraint is the rare exception rather than the rule. Neither full
faith and credit nor due process considerations2 preclude rejection of
damage limitations in the wrongful death statute of the locus state as
I A different approach has been taken by one scholar. Professor Baade of Duke
University Law School has written: "Conflict of laws questions are amazingly com-
plicated and they are, probably in good part for this very reason, rather infrequently
litigated. 'It thus seems essential that the scholar pave the way for the judge in
this area." Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress? Reflections of
Reading Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 46 TEXAS L. Rav. 141, 145 (1967).
'In Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962), former Chief Justice Warren
encouraged state courts to be flexible in the fashioning of state conflict of laws rules
and thereby indicated that conformity is not necessary:
Where more than one State has sufficiently substantial contact with the
activity in quesiton, the forum State by analysis of the interests possessed
by the States involved could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case
the law of one or another state having such an interest in the multistate
activity.
Id. at 15.
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inapplicable to a plaintiff residing in the forum state3 or, when the forum
state has some real contact with the transaction, application of local law
to a contract entered into in another state in which the law is different.4
In the exercise of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction the federal dis-
trict courts must apply the substantive law of the state in which they
sit,5 including its conflicts law.' If the conflicts rule has not been decided
by the state court, the federal court must decide as it believes the
supreme court of the state would rather than as it deems best.' If the
state law changes while a diversity case is on appeal, a federal appellate
court must apply the new state rule.' Since, by definition, diversity cases
involve parties from different states, they frequently present conflicts
problems the resolution of which composes a substantial part of the, lore
of conflict of laws. However, if another federal ground of jurisdiction
is present, the federal courts must apply federal conflict of laws rulesY
Furthermore, the normal restraint upon innovation imposed by the
doctrine of stare decisis seems singularly non-inhibitive in conflicts cases.10
Since substantial contact of the forum state with the matter in controversy
meets federal constitutional requirements and since state constitutions
' Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 912 (1963), rev'g 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962).
'Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964) ; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281
U.S. 397 (1930).
r Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (193'8).
' Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487- (1941). This requirement
includes applying the public policy of the state where this factor constitutes an
element of its conflict of laws rule. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941). See
Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1963).
'Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
319 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1963); Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon, 125 F.2d 820 (3d
Cir. 1942) (on remand). For an interesting discussion of this duty of a federal
court, see Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 394 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1968).
8 Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941).
o Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 3,76 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
"See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963), in which the court said:
[R]econsideration of the inflexible traditional rule persuades us, as already
indicated, that, in failing to take into account essential policy considerations
and objectives, its application may lead to unjust and anomalous results.
This being so, the rule, formulated as it was by the courts, should be dis-
carded.
Id. at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 751-52. See also Schwartz v.
Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551,
432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d
625 (1967) ; Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964) ;
Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 13,3 N.W.2d 408 (1965) ; Haumschild v. Con-
tinental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
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and statutes rarely prescribe conflicts rules, a state supreme court is
relatively free to dhange its conflicts rules. Of course, a state legislature
may by subsequent legislation undo judicial conflicts changes and may, in
any event, establish rules binding upon the state courts, subject only to
constitutional limitations."
The Congress of the United States has been remarkably restrained in
refraining from enacting conflict of laws legislation. Where only state
interests are involved, as in conflicting exercise of the power to tax
based on domicile, Congress has abstained and the Supreme Court has
normally held that no federal question is involved. 2 Even in the matter
of multistate defamation, by radio or television broadcasts or by nationally
distributed publications, Congress has not provided a solution to the
complex conflicts problem presented.' 8
The North Carolina General Assembly, in common with the great
majority of state legislatures in the United States, has exercised quite
sparingly its power to enact conflict of laws statutes. In a few notable
instances it has done so, and these will be examined under appropriate
classifications.
Academic writing has in recent years had a substantial influence in
some states in reshaping certain areas of conflict of laws.' 4 North Carolina
conflicts decisions have as yet been influenced little, if at all, by these
writings or by recent drafts of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws, which in some states have received judicial acceptance.' Reference
11 Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law lit A Proper Forum; A "Restatement" of the "Lex
Fori Approach," 18 OKLA. L. REv. 340 (1965); Reese, Conflict of Laws and the
Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 679, 682 (1963).
21 Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393 (1935) ; Iz re Dorrance's Estate, 115 N.J. Eq.
268, 170 A. 601 (Prerog. Ct. 1934); 116 N.J. Eq. 204, 172 A. 503 (Prerog. Ct.
1934), aff'd, 116 N.J.L. 362, 184 A. 743 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935), cert. denied, 298
U.S. 678 (1936). However, in a case in which the conflicting state inheritance
tax claims in aggregate exceeded the total assets of the estate, and Texas as one
of the contesting states filed an original bill in the Supreme Court, the Court
exercised jurisdiction and determined Massachusetts to be the state of domicile.
Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939). Also, when states were competing to
take by escheat the same unclaimed funds, original jurisdiction was exercised and
rules to resolve the conflict were prescribed by the Supreme Court. Texas v. New
Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 and 380 U.S. 518 (1965).
"A strong recommendation made by Professor William Prosser that federal
conflicts legislation was necessary to resolve the multistate defamation problem has
not produced Congressional action. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MicH. L.
RFv. 959, 1000 (1953).
", See cases cited note 10 supra.
'"See Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968); Clark v.
Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,
191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86,
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will be made to pertinent provisions of the proposed Restatement,"6 in
spite of the strong feeling of some academic writers that the whole
effort to compile a conflict of laws restatement for choice of law is mis-
guided, inappropriate, and should be scuttled."
ToRTs IN GENERAL
Practically all tort actions, with the exception of trespass to real
estate,' s are transitory and may be brought wherever the plaintiff may
obtain valid service on the defendant. This is the North Carolina rule.19
Where the tort occurs in another state the North Carolina choice
of law rule is to apply the lex loci delicti to all substantive questions.
The lex loci rule adopts the vested-rights doctrine espoused by Joseph
Henry Beale, the late Royal Professor of Law at Harvard and Reporter
for the original Restatement of Conflict of Laws. The concept is that an
act has legal significance only if, and to the extent that, the law of the
215 A.2d 677 (1966); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d
796 (1964).
', For an authoritative account of the purpose and concept of RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CoNFLIcr OF LAWs, see Reese, Conflict of Laws and The Restatement
Second, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 679 (1963). Professor Reese is the Reporter
for this Restatement undertaking.
" Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1233, 1235
(1963): "IT]he decision, rightly understood, spells the doom of all attempts, such
as that of the Restatement, to solve the problems of conflict of laws by a com-
pendium of choice-of-law rules and in particular of the Restatement (Second)'s
attempt to solve them by reference to the 'law of the state which has the most sig-
nificant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties.'" Ehrenzweig, The
"Most Significant Relationship" It The Conflicts Law of Torts: Law and Reason
Versis The Restatenent Second, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 700 (1963): "Only
the remaining hope to induce the Restaters to withdraw their latest draft on the
conflicts law of torts has prompted me to offer these comments despite my mis-
givings." See also Ehrenzweig, Restitution In The Conflict Of Laws: Law and
Reason versus the Restatement Second, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1298 (1961); Ehren-
zweig, Miscegenation in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versuts The Re-
statement Second, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 659 (1960).
" But see Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Harrison, 220 Ark. 521, 249 S.W.2d 994 (1952),
where a resident of Missouri was permitted in a cross-complaint to recover in
Arkansas for injuries to real property situated in Missouri inflicted by the plaintiff,
a resident of Arkansas who was not subject to service in Missouri.
" Fulcher v. Smith, 249 N.C. 645, 107 S.E.2d 68 (1959); Howle v. Twin
States Express, Inc., 237 N.C. 667, 75 S.E.2d 732 (1953); Rodwell v. Camel City
Coach Co., 205 N.C. 292, 171 S.E. 100 (1933); Ledford v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 179 N.C. 63, 101 S.E. 533 (1919); Harrill v. South Carolina & G. Ry., 132
N.C. 655, 44 S.E. 109 (1903). While the right of action for wrongful death is
transitory, it can only be maintained by a representative qualified by a North Caro-
lina court. In re Scarborough, 261 N.C. 565, 134 S.E.2d 529 (1964); Cannon v.
Cannon, 228 N.C. 211, 45 S.E.2d 34 (1947); Monfils v. Hazlewood, 218 N.C. 215,
10 S.E.2d 673 (1940).
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geographical jurisdiction in which it occurs gives rise to legal rights and
duties. If a legal right arises at the locus, this right vests in the injured
party and he may enforce it not only at the locus but in the courts of
other states and nations as well. If no right exists at the locus, there is
none to enforce anywhere. The North Carolina Supreme Court restated,
reconsidered, and reaffirmed this general rule in 1963 in Shaw v. Lee.2
The decision in Shaw came less than one hundred days before that
of the New York Court of Appeals in Babcock v. Jackson,21 which rejected
the lex loci conflicts rule and replaced it "by giving controlling effect
to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact
with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the
specific issue raised in the litigation."22 Recovery under New York law
for an Ontario accident was allowed since it was a case "solely affecting
New York residents and arising out of the operation of a New York
based autmobile. ' ' 3 Since Babcock the courts have been much concerned
with this problem of the choice of the substantive law to govern tort
actions. Hence it is appropriate to commence this examination of North
Carolina choice of law rules with the decision in Shaw.
The rejected contention of the plaintiff in Shaw was that the law of her
domicile, North Carolina, should apply to an automobile accident in
Virginia in which she received injuries allegedly caused by the negligent
driving of her deceased husband, also a North Carolina domiciliary.
Regarding the problem as one of the existence of a cause of action rather
than of capacity to sue,' the court applied the rule that it had earlier
announced in Howard v. Howard.25
Since the decision in Shaw, the court has consistently adhered to the
lex loci delicti rule to determine the substantive law applicable to a suit
on an out of state tort."' In Farmer v. Ferris,17 an amusement device
20258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
21 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).2 id. at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
'
3 Id. at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
21258 N.C. at 615, 129 S.E.2d at 292.
20200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931).
"The court invoked the rule in refusing to permit joinder of a husband as a
joint tortfeasor in an action brought by the wife-passenger against the owner of the
other vehicle because under the law of West Virginia, where the accident occurred,
one spouse may not sue the other in tort. Petrea v. Ryder Tank Lines, Inc., 264
N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278 (1965).
Lex loci is applied to wrongful death actions as well as to other tort suits.
Broadfoot v. Everett, 270 N.C. 429, 154 S.E.2d 522 (1967).
In one of the first decisions of the Court of Appeals of North Carolina present-
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defectively manufactured in Michigan caused injury at Carolina Beach,
North Carolina. The question presented was whether these facts consti-
tuted tortious conduct in this state so as to bring the suit within the in
personam jurisdiction asserted by North Carolina General Statute
§ 55-145(4) (1965) in behalf of North Carolina residents against foreign
non-domesticated corporations.28 After finding due process requirements
had been met, the court upheld jurisdiction saying: "[T]he place of
a wrong is in the State where the last event takes place which is neces-
sary to render the actor liable for an alleged tort."2 When the negligence
occurs in State A and its impact, producing injury, takes place in State B,
this refinement becomes necessary to determine which state law is in fact
the lex loci delicti. The rule stated by the court conforms to the great
weight of authority."0
In several tort cases the court has drawn the distinction between mat-
ters of "substance" and "procedure" and has applied lex loci to the former
and lex fori to the latter. Kirby v. Fulbright31 involved a vehicle accident
in Virginia. The court said: "Whether, under the substantive law of
Virginia, the evidence was sufficient to require its submission to the
ing a conflicts question, the court applied the lex loci (in this case Virginia) in
affirming an award made by the Industrial Commission under the Tort Claims Act.
Parsons v. Board of Educ., 4 N.C. App. 36, 39, 165 S.E.2d 776, 778 (1969).
27 260 N.C. 619, 133 S.E.2d 492 (1963), cited in Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 91 (1968).
.Id. at 624, 133 S.E.2d at 497.
20 Id. at 627, 133 S.E.2d at 498.
"In Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 16 n.35 (1962), the Supreme Court
said: "[T]he two courts below . . . conclude[d] that Oklahoma would follow the
general rule that the law of the place of injury would control even had the negli-
gence that caused the injury taken place in Oklahoma." The opinion below in 285
F.2d 521, 523 (10th Cir. 1960), in part stated:
[I]n the absence of a controlling statute providing otherwise, the general
rule is that where an act of omission or commission occurs at one place and
resulting death, personal injury, or damage takes place at another, the situs
of the actionable wrong is the place at which the death, personal injury or
property damage takes place.... And that rule has been applied in cases
in which the act of omission or commission in respect to a passenger air-
plane occurred at one place while the resulting accident and death took
place at another...
The Supreme Court then held this general conflicts rule was not applicable to a
suit brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act because of the wording of that Act.
Cf. Brendle v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1969).
" 262 N.C. 144, 136 S.E.2d 652 (1964). This distinction was also stated in
Thames v. Teer Co., 267 N.C. 565, 148 S.E.2d 527 (1966); Young v. Baltimore
& O.R.R., 266 N.C. 458, 146 S.E.2d 441 (1966); Conrad v. Miller Motor Express,
Inc., 265 N.C. 427, 144 S.E.2d 269 (1965); Cobb v. Clark, 265 N.C. 194, 143 S.E.2d
103 (1965) ; Crow v. Ballard, 263 N.C. 475, 139 S.E.2d 624 (1965).
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jury is determinable in accordance with the procedural law of this
jurisdiction."32
Lex Loci and Its Alternatives
In the United States, the majority rule continues to be that whether
conduct is actionable as a tort is determined by the substantive law of
the place where the questioned conduct produced injury.3 3 Within the last
decade, however, this rule has been changed in whole or in part in at least
fourteen jurisdictions: Arizona, 4 District of Columbia,35 Iowa,8 Ken-
tucky,37 Minnesota,38 Mississippi," Missouri, 40 New Hampshire,"' New
" 262 N.C. at 150, 136 S.E.2d at 656.
88 16 Am. JUR. 2d Conflict of Laws § 71 nn. 4 & 7 (1964), and Annot., 92
A.L.R.2d 1129, 1186-89 (1963), contain extensive citations of authorities. See also
Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 130 (1961); Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 12 (1964).
" Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968) (an interspousal
suit).
" Myers v. Gaither, 232 A.2d 577 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1967), aff'd, 404 F.2d
216 (D.C. Cir. 1968). A District of Columbia statute, imposing liability for acci-
dents caused by the theft of a vehicle on an owner who left the keys in the vehicle,
was applied to an accident in Maryland where the owner would not have been
liable under Maryland law. See Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc., 357 F.2d
581 (D.C. Cir. 1965). But see Roscoe v. Roscoe, 379 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
where upon the death of a husband, a wife was permitted to continue a suit, under
a survival statute, based upon the negligent driving of the husband in North Caro-
lina, although interspousal suits are prohibited by the law of the District of
Columbia. The court said:
We deem it sufficient to note that this appellant wife had gained a right of
action under the law of North Carolina; that right followed her here; the
husband died, and upon his death the basis of the doctrine disappeared. No
longer was there in jeopardy the domestic tranquility of the spouses. No
longer was there in existence a predicate for the assertion of a policy which
would bar continued maintenance of an action designed to vindicate the
right which had so accrued to the wife. Balancing the respective interests in
such circumstances, ... we may apply the law of North Carolina.
Id. at 99. See also Emmert v, United States, 300 F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C. 1969).
" Fabricus v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965), a wrongful death
case in which the Iowa law as to measure of damages and real party in interest
was applied to a Minnesota occurrence. However, the court said that the question
of actionable negligence depended on the law of Minnesota. Id. at 276, 132 N.W.2d
at 415. In Fuerste v. Bemis, - Iowa -, 156 N.W.2d 831 (1968), the court held
that the Iowa guest statute was applicable to an action in Iowa between Iowa resi-
dents for an alleged wrongful death occurring in Wisconsin, which had no guest
statute. The court found that all significant relationships were with the State of
Iowa.
8
'Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967), noted in 13 ST.
Louis L.J. 146 (1968). The majority opinion states:
We recognize that an attempt to apply this rule in complex situations might
involve an unstable exercise in legal gymnastics. Consequently, at this time
we limit application of the rule to a very clear case, such as we have here.
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All of the interests involved (other than the fortuitous place of accident
[Indiana]) are Kentucky interests. The guest passenger's right of action
against the driver will be determined by Kentucky law ....
Id. at 261.
" Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968). In this action
by a Minnesota resident against a North Dakota resident for automobile accident
injuries occurring while the parties were on a temporary pleasure trip in North
Dakota, the Minnesota court refused to apply a North Dakota guest statute that
would have precluded recovery. See also Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141
N.W.2d 526 (1966).
" Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968). The court applied Mississippi's
comparative negligence doctrine when occurrence was in Louisiana, but only Mis-
sissippi residents and estates were involved.
"°Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969), noted in 13 ST. Louis L.J.
467 (1969). In a guest suit, the occurrence was in Indiana, but the parties were
Missouri residents traveling in a Missouri car. Indiana had a guest statute, but
Missouri did not. Missouri applied its own law. However, only three judges
accepted the "most significant relationship" rule. The fourth judge concurred on
the ground that to enforce the Indiana statute would be against Missouri public
policy.
Previously in Robinson v. Gaines, 331 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. 1960), recovery be-
tween husband and wife domiciled in Missouri was denied for an accident occuring
in New Mexico. New Mexico and not Missouri law was applied. Gaines was
cited with approval in Toomes v. Continental Oil Co., 402 S.W.2d 321 (Mo.
1966). In Girth v. Beaty Grocery Co., 407 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. 1966), where plain-
tiff in seeking to avoid the application of the borrowing provision of the Missouri
statute of limitations urged discarding the lex loci rule and the adoption of the
contrary New York and Pennsylvania rule, the Supreme Court of Missouri refused,
saying no conflict of law problem was presented. The Kansas City, Missouri, Court
of Appeals in Neihardt v. Knipmeyer, 420 S.W.2d 27 (Kansas City, Mo. Ct. App.
1967) held:
The South Dakota guest statute is controlling in this case and we will be
governed by the decisions of the South Dakota Supreme Court in applying
it. We have been cited to no Missouri decision indicating that tort actions
tried in Missouri are not governed by the law of the state where the tort
occurred.
Id. at 29.
Note, Choice of Law Rides in Tort Cases- A Coming Conflict in Missouri,
33 Mo. L. REv. 81 (1968), in which a student recommended that Missouri depart
from the lex loci rule and adopt the approach of the Restatement (Second), was
cited with approval by the three judges voting against lex loci in Kennedy v.
Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173, 181 (Mo. 1969).
" Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966). This was a tort suit
between New Hampshire spouses. The accident occurred in Vermont, which has
a guest statute limiting host liability to gross and wilful negligence only. New
Hampshire has no guest statute. The majority opinion in allowing recovery de-
clared:
We prefer to apply the better rule of law in conflict cases .... If the law
of some other state is outmoded, an nrepealed remnant of a bygone age,
'a drag on the coattails of civilization,' . . . we will try to see our way clear
to apply our law instead. If it is our own law that is obsolete or senseless
(and it could be) we will try to apply the other state's law.
Id. at 355, 222 A.2d at 209.
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Jersey,42 New York,43 Oregon, 44 Pennsylvania,45 Rhode Island,40 and
Wisconsin. 7 To these should be added California,4 8 which had deviated
42 Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967). In an action between
New Jersey residents for injuries to an automobile guest in an accident in Ohio
the court held that "while the substantive law of Ohio governs the conduct of
the parties insofar as this relates to the rules of the road, the New Jersey rule
allowing a guest to sue his host for ordinary negligence applies to the present
case." Id. at 235, 229 A.2d at 630.
" Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963), in which the court held in a suit between residents of New York arising out
of a weekend Ontario auto accident that Ontario guest statute was inapplicable
and did not bar recovery. See also Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d
394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969); Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877,
290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
" Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967)
(court applied lex loci since Washington had the most significant relationship).
"Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). The
court applied Pennsylvania law where decedent, a resident of Pennsylvania, was
killed in Colorado aircraft crash. See also Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399
F.2d 14 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 393 U.S. 979 (1968).
"' Woodward v. Stewart, - R.I. -, 243 A.2d 917 (1968), petition for cert.
dismissed, 393 U.S. 957 (1969). In a wrongful death action where all participants
were residents of Rhode Island and the defendant driver's car was traveling to
and from points in Rhode Island when accident in Massachusetts occurred, the
court said:
The objections to the application of this significant contacts or center of
gravity approach to litigation is that the merits of the lex loci doctrine-
uniformity, predictability, and certainty of result-will be lost.
Id. at -, 243 A.2d at 920. The court continued:
The interest-weighing approach to conflict of law cases is indeed the
better rule, and justice will be more equitably administered if the Rhode
Island courts apply the rule to tort conflict cases coming before them. All
prior cases that are inconsistent with this view are hereby overruled ....
Id. at -, 243 A.2d at 923.
In Thayer v. Perini Corp., 303 F. Supp. 683 (D.R.I. 1969), a diversity wrongful
death action, the court applied the Rhode Island "more significant interest" con-
flicts rule and found that since Massachusetts had the more significant interest its
wrongful death statute should control. However, since Rhode Island refuses to
enforce the Massachusetts' statute as being penal in nature and since the court
held that the Rhode Island wrongful death statute was inapplicable, the case was
dismissed. Here the decedent and his next of kin were citizens and residents of
Rhode Island. The court said: "[T]he defendant is a Massachusetts corporation.
The defendant's alleged tortious conduct causing the injuries to and death of
the decedent occurred in Massachusetts during the construction ... of [a] coffer
dam upon which the decedent was working. . . . The relationship between the
decedent and the defendant was centered in Massachusetts." Id. at 688. Thus,
"more significant interest" analysis selected the lex loci statute as controlling, then
forum public policy struck down that statute with the spectacular result that Rhode
Island residents were denied a cause of action that could have been pursued in
either the state or federal court in Massachusetts. The more liberal provisions
of the Rhode Island wrongful death statute that plaintiff asserted to be applicable
probably induced this infortuitous forum-shopping.
""Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965), voted in 1966
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from lex loci perhaps as early as 1953. It may be noted that these cases,
while departing from prior lex loci doctrine, did not suggest application
of any rules of the road other than those of the locus.
On the other hand, courts in at least ten states recently have joined
the North Carolina Supreme Court" in re-examining and reaffirming the
lex loci rule: Connecticut,"° Delaware,51 Florida,5" Kansas, 5 Louisiana,"
Wis. L. REv. 913. Where driver and passenger, husband and wife, were Wisconsin
residents and an accident occurred in Nebraska, the Wisconsin court refused to
apply a Nebraska guest statute that would have denied recovery. The opinion indi-
cated that Nebraska rules of the road would apply. Id. at 634, 13,3 N.W.2d at 417.
See also Satchwill v. Vollrath Co., 293 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Heath v.
Zellimer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967). Actually, Wisconsin took the
first step away from lex loci in Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130,
95 N.W.2d 814 (1959). See p. 257 and note 70 infra.
" Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967). The
actions were to recover for wrongful deaths of Ohio residents killed in a Missouri
collision with a car owned and operated by a California resident. It was held
that Ohio law permitting unlimited recovery applied and not Missouri's 25,000
dollar limitation. See also Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944(1953), where the prospective defendant in a personal injury suit resulting from
an accident in Arizona died before the action was filed. California had a survival
statute, Arizona did not. The court held that since all of the parties were residents
of California and the estate was being administered there, the right to sue was
governed by the California laws relating to administration of estates.
Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963). See p. 248 supra.
O Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966).
Friday v. Smoot, - Del. -, 211 A.2d 594 (1965). Two Delaware residents
on a brief auto ride were involved in an accident in New Jersey. The court held
the Delaware guest statute not applicable and allowed the guest to recover under
New Jersey law. "[W]e think the adoption of a more significant relationship theory
would be a major change with respect to the rights of the litigants. As such,
therefore, it falls within the peculiar province of the General Assembly." Id. at -,
211 A.2d at 596-97.
" Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967). Here a
Florida resident sought recovery in federal court for the death of her Florida hus-
band in an Illinois crash of a commercial aircraft. The Fifth Circuit certified to
the Supreme Court of Florida the question of whether Florida would apply the
Illinois limitation of 30,000 dollars on damages. The Supreme Court of Florida
ruled the Illinois limitation applied and was not overriden by public policy con-
siderations. "While the place at which an event occurs may indeed be fortuitous,
that circumstance nevertheless seems to be of primary importance in determining
the legal effect to be accorded any occurrence upon which a cause of action de-
pends." Id. at 751-52. This rule was then applied by the federal court in 394 F.2d
656 (5th Cir. 1968). The rule has since been followed in subsequent cases. Mes-
singer v. Tom, 203 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1967); Lescard v. Keel, 211 So. 2d 868
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
"McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965) (court applied
Missouri limitation on damages in a personal injury and wrongful death action).
" Nicholson v. Atlas Assurance Corp., 156 So. 2d 245 (La. Ct. App.), aff'd,
245 La. 461, 158 So. 2d 612 (1963). In the Louisiana wife's suit for her husband's
injuries in Mississippi, the court held that the substantive law of Mississippi con-
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Maryland,55 Michigan, 6 Oklahoma,"7 South Carolina, "8 and Texas."
In addition, federal courts applying the conflicts rules of Arkansas,"0
Illinois,"' Massachusetts, 2 and Ohio 3 have invoked lex loci. The rule in
trolled and defeated the action. However, a subsequent case, Johnson v. St. Paul
Mercury Ins. Co., 218 So. 2d 375 (La. Ct. App. 1969), holding that the trial court
was in error in applying lex loci, has been granted a writ of review by the Supreme
Court of Louisiana. 253 La. 872, 220 So. 2d 457 (1969).
"' Hartford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bruchey, 248 Md. 669, 238 A.2d 115 (Ct. App.
1968). This action was brought by the husband for loss of his wife's consortium due
to an accident in Virginia. Even though Maryland law would have allowed such
a recovery, the Maryland Court of Appeals followed Virginia law, which did not
allow recovery. See also White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966).
" Abendschein v. Farrell, 11 Mich. App. 662, 162 N.W.2d 165 (1968), aff'd,
382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969) (recovery denied under Ontario guest
statute where guests in auto accident were New York residents traveling to Michigan
and the defendant driver a Michigan resident). In affirming the intermediate
appellate court the Michigan Supreme Court expressly refused to follow Babcock
v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). The court
quoted with approval from Judge Van Voorhis' dissenting opinion in Babcock.
382 Mich. at -, 170 N.W.2d at 142-43.
See also Owen v. Illinois Baking Corp., 260 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
"' Cherokee Lab., Inc. v. Rogers, 398 P.2d 520 (Okla. 1965). "[W]e decline to
hold with the view that the public policy of this state pursuant to the theory of
Section 7 of Article XXIII of our Constitution is such or so strong as to require
a determination that the Missouri statutory limit of $25,000 . . .does not apply."
Id. at 525.
" Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964). A husband and wife,
residents of South Carolina, were in an automobile accident in Georgia. In South
Carolina a wife may sue her husband, and in Georgia she cannot. In holding this
suit could not be maintained, the court pointed out that the North Carolina Supreme
Court had recently refused to abandon lex loci.
" Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968).
The petitioner vigorously and ably argues that the State of Colorado actually
has little concern with this unfortunate accident which took the lives of four
Texans and one Illinois resident while they were returning to Texas on a
business trip in behalf of a Texas based commercial activity, and points out
that the defendant is a Texas corporation and that the negligent pilot was
also a Texas resident. From these circumstances, it is contended that essen-
tially this is a Texas controversy which should be controlled by Texas law.
Id. at 184. Nevertheless, the court applied the law of Colorado in the case. Id.
at 182. See also Gaston v. B. F. Walker, Inc., 400 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Helene
Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967).
"0 Glick v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 343 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1965).
" Karczewski v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 274 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
"2 Doody v. John Sexton & Co., 411 F.2d 1119 (1st Cir. 1969).
" Goranson v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 345 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965). This case
was a wrongful death diversity action in which the decedent had been a resident of
Ohio and had been killed in an aircraft crash in Virginia. After finding that Ohio
had followed the lex loci rule continuously since 1891, the federal court in applying
the Virginia wrongful death damage limitation made this observation:
There is considerable discussion in recent cases on whether the extent of
damages recoverable is to be treated as part of the substantive or procedural
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Alaska, 4 Indiana, 5 North Dakota,68 and South Dakota 7 is not dear.
law of the state. The reasoning in these cases is persuasive but we are not
at liberty to adopt a new rule of conflict of laws in Ohio ....
Id. at 752.
" In Alaska, as to tort cases in general, the issue has been expressly reserved.
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alas. 1968). The court did decide that
domiciliary law, not lex loci, applies to interspousal immunities and liabilities in
multistate tort actions when the litigants are domiciliaries of Alaska and their
only contacts with the situs of the tort are transitory in nature.
" In a diversity case the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit surmised
that Indiana would discard the lex loci rule. Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F.2d
617 (7th Cir. 1965). Thereafter, in another case the Indiana Court of Appeals,
after pointing out that the decisions of the circuit court are not binding on the
state, decided that when an injury covered by workmen's compensation occurred
in Kentucky, Indiana had the greater interest in having its law applied. On appeal
the Supreme Court of Indiana reversed on another ground and limited its decision
to the holding that the defendant was covered by the compensation act and was
not subject to a common law suit. Witherspoon v. Salm, - Ind. App. -, 237
N.E.2d 116 (1968), rev'd, - Ind. -, 243 N.E.2d 876 (1969). This result seems
to leave Indiana in its original position as a lex loci jurisdiction. On the point of
compensation act coverage, the supreme court decision relied on Warner v. Leder,
234 N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d 6 (1952).
" Another borderline situation exists regarding the torts choice of law rule
in North Dakota and South Dakota. A North Dakota federal district court judge
has stated that the choice of law rule in a multistate tort situation has not been
determined in either North or South Dakota. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967). The action was brought
against the United States under the Federal Torts Claims Act for the wrongful
death of a working wife and mother, a resident of North Dakota, who was slain
in Minnesota by her mentally disturbed husband, also a resident of North Dakota,
after his release, without proper supervision, from a federal mental institution in
South Dakota. The judge awarded the plaintiff administrator a 200,000 dollar
judgment under the unlimited North Dakota wrongful death statute although the
wrongful death statute of South Dakota limited recovery to 30,000, dollars and that
of Minnesota to 35,000 dollars. The decision recognized the obligation of the
court to apply the conflicts rule of the state in which the negligence occurred, here
South Dakota, in a Federal Tort Claims Act suit. The judge decided that when
the Supreme Court of South Dakota had occasion to announce-a multistate tort
choice of law rule, it would adopt the "most significant interest" rule and not
lex loci.
This decision is persuasive as to what the conflicts rule of South Dakota may
become, and possibly, by way of dictum only, persuasive as to what the North
Dakota conflicts rule may be when decided. However, in view of the rule that
in diversity cases such prophecies by federal courts are not binding on state courts
and that state courts may reach, and in fact have reached, opposite conclusions, it
seems premature to score the Dakotas as "most significant interest" jurisdictions.
It might be argued that the usual conflicts rule in diversity suits would not be
applicable to a Federal Tort Claims Act case. However, Richards v. United States,
369 U.S. 1 (1962) held that the federal courts in such cases have an obligation
to follow the conflicts rule of the state where the act of negligence occurred. This
requirement is comparable to the obligation in diversity cases to follow the conflicts
rules of the state in which the federal district court sits. See note 30 smpra.
"7 Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409
(D.N.D. 1967). The court said:
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In any event, it is believed that excluding at present these four states
from a count of lex loci and anti-lex loci jurisdictions, as declared since
1963, is appropriate and introduces no distortion.
Applying a baseball approach to this judicial ferment of the last seven
years, the score stands tied at 15 to 15 on the question of abandoning lex
loci except as applied to rules of the road. This count, while compre-
hensive, is not necessarily exhaustive, nor is it likely to remain static.
Again resorting to baseball, a tie score in what may be likened to the
sixth inning yields no grounds for one to predict which side will ultimately
prevail. Further, this approach has the weakness of being quantitative
rather than qualitative. It does seem to follow from this substantial differ-
ence in judicial opinion that neither side is annointed with infallibility.
From judicial opinions, academic writings, and Restatement drafts that
reject lex loci as an across-the-board rule for selecting substantive tort
law, there emerge, in varying combinations, various alternative precepts.
Some of these alternatives are as follows:
1. Emphasize some aspect of the situation that may be said not to be
controlled by "tort" law. For example, in an automobile injury case
where the defendant dies prior to the suit being filed, "administration
of estates" is emphasized so as a matter of "procedure" to bring it
within the survival statute of the forum state instead of the lex loci
delicti of the state in which the tort occurred, which has no survival
statute.68 The "procedure" approach has received judicial criticism.
This court is of the opinion that the South Dakota Supreme Court
would follow its sister states, Minnesota and Wisconsin, in adopting "the
most significant relationship" or the "most significant contacts" rule, and
upon that basis and for the further reason that the "contacts" rule is a
modern and enlightened one, the law of the State of North Dakota will be
applied to the facts in this case.
Newgard's having been a patient at Meade in South Dakota was simply
happenstance so far as that state was concerned. Similarly, Eloise Newgard's
having been physically in Minnesota when she was murdered was mere cir-
cumstance. She was there visiting relatives. Neither South Dakota nor
Minnesota had or have the slightest interest in Eloise A. Newgard or her
three children. The significant and very real relationships with all here
involved were and are with the State of North Dakota, which very ob-
viously has a vital interest in this litigation.
Id. at 419, 420. See note 66 .mpra.
"3 Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). Once the "pro-
cedure" label is affixed, lex fori is applicable under traditional principles. For an
example of such labeling of wrongful death damages, see Kilberg v. Northeastern
Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).9 Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 92 Idaho 718, 449 P.2d 378 (1962).
Courts often apply the terms "procedural" and "substantive" to laws as a
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Another example is to emphasize that an interspousal tort suit in-
volves "family law" or "status" in order to bring it under the
substantive law of the state of the marital domicile. °
2. Use the substantive law of the state having the most significant con-
tacts with the matter litigated.7'
3. Analyze policy to determine which litigant has the greater policy
interest.72
4. Analyze policy to determine which state involved has the greatest
policy interest."3
matter of conclusory labeling without disclosing the basis for the conclusion.
Moreover, matters relating to the measure of damages are said to be sub-
stantive rather than procedural. . . . To characterize these statutes as
procedural would be to invite forum shopping. Therefore we view the
question as one of deciding whose law, as to the particular issue involved,
has the more significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.
Id. at 722, 449 P.2d at 382. See also Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183
N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133
N.W.2d 408 (1965).
' 
T Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
Hawmschild was modified by Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d
408 (1965).
' Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963).
Comparison of the relative "contacts" and "interests" of New York and
Ontario in this litigation, vis-3-vis the issue here presented, makes it clear
that the concern of New York is unquestionably the greater and more direct
and that the interest of Ontario is at best minimal. The present action
involves injuries sustained by a New York guest as the result of the negli-
gence of a New York host in the operation of an automobile garaged, li-
censed, and undoubtedly insured in New York, in the course of a week-endjourney which began and was to end there. In sharp contrast, Ontario's
sole relationship with the occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstance
that the accident occurred there.
Id. at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
Judge Van Voorhis, in dissent, said:
The present case makes substantial changes in the law of torts. The ex-
pressions "center of gravity," "grouping of contacts," and "significant con-
tacts" are catchwords which were not employed to define and are inadequate
to define a principle of law, and were neither applied to nor are they
applicable in the realm of torts.
Id. at 486, 191 N.E.2d at 286, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 753. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345
U.S. 571, 582 (1953). See also Cheatham, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63
CoL m. L. Rnv. 1229, 1230 (1963). "Most significant contacts" is criticized by
Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1233 (1963).
' See Ehrenzweig, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 1243,
1246 (1963). Chief Justice Traynor in Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 553, 432
P.2d 727, 729, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 33 (1967), wrote: "The forum must search to find
the proper law to apply based on the interests of the litigants and the involved
states."
' See Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966) ; Mellk v. Sarahson,
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5. Construe the situation, if possible, so as to conclude that there is no
real conflict of law involved.74
6. Apply the law having any connection with the transaction that will
permit the plaintiff to recover or to obtain a maximum recovery. This
proposal might be termed the "judgment for plaintiff" approach.71
Courts have been slow to state baldly this principle as a motivating
factor, but the interests of states in seeing that their doctors and
hospitals do not go unpaid and that plaintiffs do not become relief
recipients are stated as legitimate factors to be considered."0 This
principle has, however, been the conflicts rule consistently applied in
permitting lenders to recover in the face of usury statutes. Full re-
covery of the principal and interest stipulated is allowed if permitted
under the law of any state substantially related to the transaction.77
Furthemore, if the rate is illegal in all such states, the penalty imposed
on the lender is that prescribed by the most lenient state.78 In con-
49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d
677 (1966) ; Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965) ; Currie,
supra note 71.
' Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961);
Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. Rnv. 657 (1959). Currie,
stpra note 71, at 1242 says: "If the court finds an apparent conflict between the
interests of the two states it should reconsider. A more moderate and restrained
interpretation of the policy or interest of one state or the other may avoid
conflict."
" Ehrenzweig, Enterprise Liability in the Conflict of Laws, 69 YALE L.J. 595,
794, 978 (1960); Lorenzen, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 47 L.Q. REV.
483, 492 (1931).
"' E. CHEATHAM, E. GRISWOLD, W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CONFLICT or LAWS,
CASES AND MATERIALS 487 (1964) ; Cavers, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63
COLUm. L. REv. 1219, 1225 (1963). See Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416
Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
"" Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927). This rather
Draconian rule has been only slightly ameliorated in North Carolina by N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 53-190 (Supp. 1969) which provides:
No loan contract made outside this state in the amount or of the value of
nine hundred dollars ($900.00) or less for which a greater consideration or
charges than are authorized by § 53-173 of this article have been charged,
contracted for, or received shall be enforced in this State and every person
in anywise participating therein in this State shall be subject to the provisions
of this article; provided, that the foregoing shall not apply to loans legally
made in another state. No lender licensed to do business under this article
may collect, or cause to be collected, any loan made by a lender in another
state to a borrower who was a legal resident of North Carolina at the time
the loan was made. The purchase of a loan account shall not alter this
provision. (Emphasis added.)
"8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203, comment d at 298(Proposed Official Draft, May 1, 1968) (pt. II) states: "If a contract would be
usurious under the general usury statues of all states to which it has a substantial
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tract conflicts cases this technique is referred to as the principle of
validation and is based on the concept that the parties intended their
consensual transaction to have legal validity. There is no precisely
comparable consensual feature in the tort field, but some of the tort
cases rejecting lex loci discuss the relationship of the parties in at
least neo-consensual terms.79
7. Apply the substantive law of the forum.8 ° For wholly different reasons,
this rule was the common law approach when neither party pleaded
and proved foreign law differing from that of the forum.8
8. Refuse to entertain jurisdiction of the case if it presents a conflict
between the law of two jurisdictions neither of which is the forum,
and the forum is itself disinterested.
8 2
relationship, the forum will apply the usury statute of that state which imposes the
lightest penalty."
" E.g., Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
Predictability of legal results in advance of the event is largely irrelevant,
since automobile accidents are not planned. The expectations of the present
parties, if they had any, as to legal liabilities and insurance coverage for
accidents, would be with reference to their own state, and they would think
in terms of lawsuits brought in New Hampshire courts under New Hamp-
shire law, if they thought about the matter at all.
Id. at 355, 222 A.2d at 209. See also Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447
P.2d 254 (1968); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796
(1964) ; Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 33 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
"0 Currie, supra note 71, at 1242 says: "For the real problems, in which the
forum's interests are at stake, there can be no judicial solution except application of
the law of the forum."
1 See Leary v. Gledhill, 8 N.J. 260, 84 A.2d 725 (1951). Since 1931 in North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-4 (1969) has provided for judicial notice of the law
of the United States, or of any other state or territory of the United States, or
of the District of Columbia, or of any foreign country. The effect of this statute
is to require North Carolina courts on their own motion to raise conflict of laws
questions and to consider foreign law when the facts in issue make such action
appropriate. Arnold v. Ray Charles Enterprises, 264 N.C. 92, 96, 141 S.E.2d 14,
17 (1965).
"2 The danger of forum shopping, possibly advanced by a primary application
of forum law, will have to be reduced by the substitution for the obsolete
"transient rule" of personal jurisdiction, of a new, now growing, common
law of "forum conveniens." That law will limit jurisdiction to courts
whose contacts with the case or the parties are sufficient to justify primary
application of the municipal rule or of such foreign rules as are called for
by forum policy.
Statement of Ehrenzweig, contained in CONFLICT OF LAws, CASES AND MATERIALS,
supra note 76, at 479. Compare Currie, supra note 71, at 478:
If the forum is disinterested, but an unavoidable conflict exists between the
interests of two other states, and the court cannot with justice decline to
adjudicate the case, it should apply the law of the forum, at least if that law
corresponds with the law of one of the other states. Alternatively, the court
might decide the case by a candid exercise of legislative discretion, resolving
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9. Apply in each case the "better" rule of law that has any relevancy.Y8
Such a rule would naturally bring into play in each case the sub-
jective judgment of the adjudicators. Who may, on either side of
the bench, with infallibility determine the "better" rule? Does it mean
that on facts identical except for locus the court of forum State A
will apply lex fori when the locus is State B, but lex loci if State C?
Related to the "better rule," yet distinguishable, is Professor Caver's
insistence on reaching a "just" result "fair to the parties affected,"
while studiously avoiding "jurisdiction-selecting" rules or "result
selective" rules. He proposes to effectuate this rule by establishing
seven principles of preference, five of which pertain particularly to tort
actions."'
10. Make eclectic application to each separate issue presented the law of
the jurisdiction that has the most significant relationship to that
particular issue.s5 "Flexibility" is promoted in a geometric ratio if
different tests of "significant relationship" are used in determining
which law is to prevail in each different area of conflict in a single
case.
Obviously these alternatives are not necessarily mutually exclusive,
and in some cases several might be (and indeed have been) used to sup-
port a given result. In other instances, various alternatives may be
in conflict, thus necessitating a choice. At this point predictability of
outcome becomes most difficult and there is real danger of "slipping into
a chaos of essentially meaningless ad hoc decisions.""0 One school of
thought feels that predictability should not be a controlling factor.
8 7
the conflict as it believes it would be resolved by a supreme legislative body
having power to determine which interest should be required to yield.
This last idea is borrowed from the civil law world, where often the law requires
judges to determine a question not otherwise decided as they believe the legislative
body would determine it.
88 Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966), quoted in note 41 supra.
8 D. CAvRs, THE CHoIcE-oF-LAw PROCESS 122, 139-180 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as CAVERS]. To grasp fully this proposal, reading of this scholarly book is
necessary. It has been subjected to a critical review, the thrust of which is that
Cavers does not deviate very far from the Currie doctrine, and that where he does
deviate, he is wrong. See Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress?
Reflections on Reading Cavers' The Choice-of-Law Process, 46 TEXAS L. Rnv. 141(1967).8 E.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963); Woodward v. Stewart, - R.I. -, 243 A.2d 917 (1968), petition for cert.
disnissed 393 U.S. 957 (1969).8 CAVERS, supra note 84, at 121.
87It is argued by some writers that adoption of a more flexible rule does
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One thing clearly emerges. Those who disagree with the lex loci
rule are not in agreement among themselves."8 There has been a torrent
of academic writing on the subject, involving much high-level bickering,
that is almost entirely adverse to lex loci.8 9
There remains for consideration the rule adopted by Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, which, for torts, contemplates selective
departure from the lex loci rule laid down in Restatement (First) .g° The
new rule embodies an orderly listing of factors, some vague and some
specific, to be considered in choosing applicable law, but leaves priorities
to judicial discretion. 1 The general availability of the Restatement
away with certainty... Also, the argument adds, the old rule is much easier
to apply and facilitates the task of the attorney in advising his client ....
The reply is simply stated. Ease of application and predictability are in-
sufficient reasons to retain an unsound rule....
Griffin v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 16, 203 A.2d 796, 803 (1964).88 This disagreement has been commented on even by a court that has seen fit
to depart from lex loci. "Although the overwhelming majority of writers are
opposed to retention of the place of the injury rule, there is disagreement as to the
successor to that rule." Griffin v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 13, 203 A.2d
796, 802 (1964).
'D See CAvERs, supra note 84; B. CURIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON TRE CONFLICT
or LAWS (1963) ; Cavers, Currie, & Leflar, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 1212 (1963); Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law,
52 CoLUM. L. REv. 959 (1952); Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New
York, 1963 DUKE L.J. 1; Ehrenzweig, The 'Most Significant Relationship' in the
Conflicts Law of Torts, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 700 (1963); Harper, Policy
Basis of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading Professor Lorenzen's
Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155 (1947); Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-
Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1584 (1966); Leflar, Choice-
Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. RPv. 267 (1966) ; Leflar,
Conflict of Laws, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 36 (1961); Reese, Conflict of Laws and the
Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 679 (1963); Traynor, Is This
Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 657 (1959); Weintraub, A Methodfor Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215 (1963); Note, Conflict
of Laws: Pennsylvania Repudiates Place of Injury Rule, Adopts Governmental
Interest Analysis, 1965 DUKE LJ. 623; Note, Conflict of Laws: An Analysis of
New Restatement Rule as Applied by Fourth Circuit, 1964 DUKE L.J. 377; Note,
Conflict of Laws: Forum Applies Foreign Law, Rejecting Foreign Statutes of
Limitation-An Unjustifiable Result under the Governmental Interest Analysis,
1963 DUKE L.J. 762; Note, Conflict of Laws-Choice-of-Laws: The Greatest
Interest Rule, 47 N.C.L. REv. 407 (1968); Note, Conflict of Laws-Departure
from Lex Loci, 45 N.C.L. REv. 505 (1967); Note, Conflicts-Most Significant
Relation Rule, 43 N.C.L. Rnv. 586 (1965); Note, Conflict of Laws-Most
Significant Relationship Rule, 42 N.C.L. Rlv. 419 (1964) ; Note, Conflict of Laws-
Capacity to Sue-Which Law Should Govern?, 41 N.C.L. REv. 843 (1964).
" Section 378 of the original Restatement stated: "The law of the place of
wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury."
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (Proposed Official Draft,
May 2, 1967) (Choice of Law Principles):
19701
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
(Second) and its relationship to the respectable Restatement family will
probably cause it to be cited judicially with some frequency, at least in
those jurisdictions departing from lex loci. In fact, it has been cited
with approval in at least twelve jurisdictions9 2 that have abandoned lex
lociY3
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory
directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of
the applicable rule of law include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the rele-ant policies of other interested states and the relative interests
of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determining and application of the law to be applied.
Professor Willis Reese, Reporter for Restatement (Second) has enunciated policies
to guide courts in deciding choice of law questions. In general, these policies are
reflected in the provisions of section 6. Reese, Conflict of Laws and The Restate-
ment (Second), 28 LAw & CONTFMP. PROD. 679, 682-90 (1964).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (Proposed Official Draft,
May 1, 1968) (The General Principle) provides:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort
are determined by the local law of the state which, as to that issue, has
the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under
the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place
of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue.
In the May 1, 1968 Draft, §§ 146, 147 and 175, dealing respectively with per-
sonal injuries, injuries to land and other tangible things, and wrongful death, all
prescribe lex loci unless some other state has "a more significant relationship"
to the occurrence, the parties, or (under § 147) the thing.
The new approach of the Restatement (Second) has engendered some protest.
See Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 15, 203 A.2d 796, 803 (1964).
"
2Arizona, District of Columbia, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Wisconsin. The
respective citations are those given in notes 34-37, 39, 41-47 supra.
" The abandonment does not signify a unanimity of judicial opinion as to
the process to be followed in determining choice of tort law where lex loci has
been rejected. At least three jurisdictions seem to prefer the summarization
made by Professor Leflar in Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,
41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267 (1966). In Woodward v. Stewart, - R.I. -, 243 A.2d
917, 923 (1968), the court said:
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Restatement (Second) makes explicit that lex loci and the most sig-
nificant relationship rule may, on occasion, coincide, but that, depending
on the facts, one or the other may be chosen without doing violence to
reason. 4 There are those who will find virtue in the very thing to which
some have objected, namely, the general guidelines afforded by the
formulation of Restatement (Second) to aid counsel in constructing a
theory of their case and courts in their process of decision.
Some proponents of the theory of most significant relationship would
apply their method not only in tort cases but in all choice of law cases,
with the possible exception of those purporting to affect title to real
property located in another state. Some would limit it to tort and con-
tract cases.95 The possibility at the other end of the scale is that the
The Supreme Court of at least two of our sister jurisdictions, namely Wis-
consin and New Hampshire, have considered this problem and on cogent
reasoning and analysis have found merit in the guidelines first enunciated
by Dean Leflar. These are:
(1) Predictability of results.
(2) Maintenance of interstate and international order.
(3) Simplification of the judicial task.
(4) Advancement of the forum's governmental interests.
(5) Application of the better rule of law.
Like the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, we are persuaded that those guide-
lines combine a "workable brevity" with a reasoned analysis leading this
court to their application....
See also Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Heath v. Zellmer,
35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).
"See Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PROB. 679, 699 (1963).
"Fairly precise rules have in general been stated in the case of status,
corporations, and property, since, on the basis of present knowledge, it is
deemed possible to identify and to give effect to the most important policies
in these areas. Present experience, on the other hand, with respect to con-
tracts and torts does not permit the formulation of definite rules with any
reasonable assurance that these rules would give appropriate effect to what
are here the most significant policies. Hence the more general and more
flexible formulation of 'state of most significant relationship' has been resorted
to. Presumably more definite and precise rules can be stated after more
experience has accumulated. That will be the task of future Restatenents.
Id. 699.
Across-the-board application of governmental-interests analysis may have been
voiced by judge Keating in In re Estate of Crichton, 20 N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E.2d
799, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967). This decision upheld the New York will of a New
York decedent that excluded a second wife from whom he had been separated for
thirty years. The decision disallowed the wife's claim under Louisiana community
property law to half of the personal property situated in Louisiana. The opinion
reads, "The choice of law decision we must make in this case should be guided by
the same considerations that have guided our decisions in other choice of law cases."
Id. at 133, 228 N.E.2d at 805, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 819. "New York, as the domicile of
Martha and Powell Crichton, has not only the dominant interest in the application
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significant relationship approach may be limited to certain classifications
of torts9" and that an ultimate reapplication of stare decisis would restore
a reasonable degree of stability.
Interspousal Tort Liability
Some states, including North Carolina,97 have, either by statute or
case law or both, removed all impediment to tort liability between spouses.
In other states, however, the common law rule that there is no such
liability continues to prevail."' This disparity gives rise to frequent
conflicts between the law of the marital domicile and lex loci. Shaw v.
Lee99 involved such a conflict. After classifying the problem as "tort"
rather than emphasizing "status," "marital domicile," or "family law,"
the court applied the traditional lex loci rule. In doing so it adhered to
its earlier rule in multistate interspousal tort cases.'0 0
The application of lex loci to interspousal tort cases was the almost
unanimous rule in the United States up to 1955.101 Since then, upon
invocation of one or more of the alternatives discussed above, courts in
at least eight states have departed from it."0 2
of its law and policy but the only interest." Id. at 134, 228 N.E.2d at 806, 281
N.Y.S.2d at 820. The effect of this language is obscured by the fact that in saying
"New York, as the domicile . . . , has . . .the only interest," the court declared
and applied the traditional rule that matrimonial domicile law determines ques-
tions of personal property. See also It re Estate of Clark, 21 N.Y.2d 478, 236
N.E.2d 152, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1968).
"' What we do know now with fair certainty is that choice of law is too
vast and complicated an area to be governed by a relatively small number
of simple rules of general application. What is needed instead is a large
number of relatively narrow rules that will be applicable only in precisely
defined situations.
Reese, supra note 94, at 681.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5 (1966) provides: "A husband and wife have a
cause of action against each other to recover damages sustained to their person
or property as if they were unmarried." Regarding this statute (then § 52-10.1),
the court in Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 616, 129 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1963),
said: "The Legislature did not intend to extend its enactments beyond our
borders and create in a spouse a right of action against the other for acts done
beyond the borders of North Carolina."
"Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955). "The courts in a majority of jurisdictions
have adhered to the common law rule that one spouse has no right of action against
the other to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the other." Id. 636.
See Scholtens v. Scholtens, 230 N.C. 149, 52 S.E.2d 350 (1949).
" 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
100 Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931).
"'01 Armot., 96 A.L.R.2d 973, 976 (1964).
.. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alas. 1968); Schwartz v. Schwartz,
103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d
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During the same period, courts in at least four states other than North
Carolina have reaffirmed that lex loci is determinative in interspousal tort
cases.
1 0 3
In 1967 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted this statute:
A husband and wife shall have a cause of action against each other
to recover damages for personal injury, property damage or wrongful
death arising out of acts occurring outside of North Carolina, and such
action may be brought in this State when both were domiciled in North
Carolina at the time of such acts.10
It is within the prerogative of a legislature to enact conflict of laws rules
so long as no constitutional limitation is exceeded. It is improbable that
218 (1955); Bats v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966) (suit between
parent and child); Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963);
Koplick v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958); McSwain v.
McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966) (by applying the Pennsylvania law,
that of the marital domicile, recovery between the spouses was denied) ; Haumschild
v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959). Some of these
cases have been interestingly discussed in the later case of Woodward v. Stewart,
- R.I. -, 243 A.2d 917 (1968). See also Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213
N.E.2d 544 (1966).
"'Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Nicholson v.
Atlas Assurance Corp., 156 So. 2d 245 (La. App. 1963), aff'd, 245 La. 461, 158
So. 2d 612 (1963); Robinson v. Gaines, 331 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. 1960); Oshiek v.
Oshiek, 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964). See also LaChance v. Service Truck-
ing Co., 215 F. Supp. 162 (D. Md. 1963).
""' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5.1 (Supp. 1969). A member of the General Assembly
who sponsored this legislation indicated, as to an early draft, that his primary
purpose was to permit suit between husband and wife:
In our mobile society it is quite normal for North Carolinians to b! tempo-
rarily out of the state and become involved in any number of situations
which bring about personal injury or death. It is also my understanding
that the law of the situs controls, even though the person may have lived in
North Carolina all of his life and would be allowed a recovery under the
laws of this state. I have particular reference to husbands and wives motor-
ing through various states and becoming involved in an automobile accident
in a state not allowing one spouse to sue the other. In fact, my proposed
Legislation is aimed primarily at that particular situation....
Letter from George T. Clark to J. Dickson Phillips, Jr., January 24, 1967.
A suggestion by the author of this article that the legislation might be
broadened to allow tort suits between parent and child was not included in the
adopted legislation. That suggestion read as follows:
In personal injury, property damage and wrongful death actions brought
in North Carolina, arising out of acts occurring outside of North Carolina
between husband and wife, or parent and minor child or children, who were
domiciled in North Carolina at the time of such acts, the substantive tort
law of North Carolina shall determine the right to interfamilial action and
the standard of care due to such passengers by such motor vehicle drivers.
,For a discussion of the statute, see Whitman, Conflict of Spousal Immuinity Laws:
The Legislature Takes a Hand, 46 N.C.L. Rav. 506 (1968).
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this disparity of treatment accorded to spouses domiciled in North Caro-
lina, as distinguished from nonresident spouses, is unconstitutional.10
This legislative conflicts rule has not yet been construed in a reported
decision of a North Carolina court. It appears to make clear a legislative
intent to give extra-territorial effect to local law permitting tort suits
between husband and wife, but only if both were domiciled in North Caro-
lina at the time. This intent seems to preclude the applicability of the
statute to any other situation no matter how closely related.
Since the statute applies only when North Carolina is the domicile
of both spouses, a wife domiciled in North Carolina who is injured by
the negligence of her husband in Virginia, which does not recognize inter-
spousal tort liability, could not recover from him if he is domiciled in
South Carolina, even though the local law of each domicile permits such
suit. The same result would follow if both were residents of South Caro-
lina, or any other state permitting interspousal recovery, if lex loci, ap-
plicable under Shaw, denied such recovery. On the other hand, lex loci
would not prevent a Virginia wife from recovering in North Carolina
courts for injuries caused by her Virginia husband in North Carolina or
in any other state permitting interspousal suit. In all of these cases, the
statute presumably preserves the existing judge-made conflicts law that
is not inconsistent with it.106
A difficult question is presented when North Carolina spouses are
driver and passenger and the driver's simple negligence causes injury
in a state that prohibits recovery by guests except for gross negligence
or willful misconduct. If lex loci bars interspousal suits, the North Caro-
lina statute clearly prevails as to that feature. But does the statute intend
that a spouse may recover when, under lex loci, a non-spouse guest could
not? The statutory language provides no assistance. It does not specify
what shall constitute a cause of action. On its face, it simply puts spouses
on the same basis as other litigants. If the legislature had intended in such
cases that the substantive tort law of North Carolina should determine
the standard of care due a spouse-passenger by a spouse-driver, it could
.0. See Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963), rev'g 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962).
1. E.g., Bogen v. Bogen, 219 N.C. 51, 54-55, 12 S.E.2d 649, 651-52 (1941).
In this four-to-three decision an Ohio-domiciled wife was permitted to recover for
injuries negligently inflicted upon her in North Carolina by the driving of her
Ohio-domiciled husband, though under the law of Ohio interspousal tort suits
were not permitted. The court did not discuss lex loci. The majority appear to
have treated the question as procedural.
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have so stated. The court could reach this result if it wished,107 but
it is under no clear legislative direction to do so. It is well to remember
that the opinion in Shaw was a general reaffirmance of lex loci and was
not limited to the issue of whether one spouse could sue the other.
A similar problem arises in suits predicated upon torts committed in
a state that limits the dollar amount of recovery, denies damages for
deceased's pain and suffering, or diminishes some other element of dam-
ages recognized in North Carolina if the action is brought in North Caro-
lina by one spouse domiciled in the forum state against the other who is
similarly domiciled. Do the North Carolina rules placing no limit on
recovery and specifying elements of damages recoverable. s apply? With-
out the interspousal statute North Carolina would certainly follow lex
loci.' °0 Moreover, that statute does not specify the measure of damages
and clearly does not purport to give general extra-territorial effect to
North Carolina tort damage rules. If read as inferentially carving out
domiciled spouses for preferred treatment over other North Carolina
domiciliaries, the statute is constitutionally suspect under the equal
protection clause.
The only reported North Carolina case since Shaw involving the
interspousal issue was a 1965 case"0 in which the plaintiff, a North Caro-
lina wife, was injured in West Virginia. Alleging negligence on the
part of the North Carolina husband, defendant by cross action sought
contribution from him. The court, dismissing the cross action, said:
A defendant who has been sued for tort may bring into the action
for the purpose of enforcing contribution ... only a joint tort-feasor
whom plaintiff could have sued originally in the same action ...
The law of West Virginia does not permit one spouse to sue the other
in tort .... North Carolina applies the lex loci delicti ....
207 See Guest Statute Cases discussed pp. 268-69 infra.
N08 .C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174 (Supp. 1969).
100 See Caldwell v. Abernethy, 231 N.C. 692, 58 S.E.2d 762 (1950).
... Petrea v. Ryder Tank Lines, Inc., 264 N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278 (1965).
1
' The court also declared:
Original defendant . . . argues . . . that we should overrule Shaw v. Lee
. . . and thus abandon our well-established conflicts rule, in order to apply
the law of the state which has had "the most significant relationship or con-
tacts with the matter in dispute"-in this case, appellant contends, North
Carolina. Such an approach is referred to as the "center of gravity" or
"grouping of contacts" theory .... Notwithstanding that appellant's counsel
in his brief and in his oral argument presented his case to this court in the
best possible light, the same reasons which dictated our decision in Shaw
v. Lee ... constrain us to adhere to it....
Id. at 231, 141 S.E.2d at 279. Compare Emmert v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 45
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Had this case arisen after the 1967 statute, presumably the cross action
would have been allowed.
Guest Statute Cases
In Crow v. Ballard.2 the North Carolina Supreme Court made it
clear that its general lex loci rule applied to actions involving a guest
statute."3  This result is in accord with the vast weight of authority
in the United States."
Probably the earliest departure from strict application of lex loci
to guest statute cases was Babcock v. Jackson."5 The court found that
the dominant contact was with New York, the state of domicile of both
the guest and host, and applied the ordinary negligence rule of New
York rather than the guest statute of Ontario, the state in which the
accident occurred. At least six other jurisdictions have followed Babcock
in permitting recovery in the face of impeding guest statutes of the
place of the tort."16
The considerations involved in fashioning a conflicts rule in this
area are essentially the same as for tort cases in general. Those who
advocate the "most significant contacts" approach might well assert that
if the domicile of both guest and host is in a single state other than
that of the tort, this fact alone goes a long way toward establishing
"most significant contact." Others, however, would reject such an ap-
proach on the ground that any mechanical rule for selecting controlling
law should not be tolerated. Lex loci proponents are likely to say that
(D.D.C. 1969), in which it was held that the law of the defendant father's domi-
cile, not lex loci, controls the right to contribution.
:1"2263 N.C. 475, 139 S.E.2d 624 (1964).
'-See Frisbee v. West, 260 N.C. 269, 132 S.E.2d 609 (1963); Doss v. Sewell,
257 N.C. 404, 125 S.E.2d 899 (1962) ; Kizer v. Bowman, 256 N.C. 565, 124 S.E.2d
543 (1962); Nix v. English, 254 N.C. 414, 119 S.E.2d 220 (1961); Hale v. Hale,
219 N.C. 191, 13 S.E.2d 221 (1941); Brumsey v. Mathias, 216 N.C. 743, 6 S.E.2d
496 (1940). See also Desch v. Reeves, 163 F. Supp. 213 (M.D.N.C. 1958).
'
1
,Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 12 (1964).
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). The court said:
"Although the rightness or wrongness of defendant's conduct may depend upon the
law of the particular jurisdiction through which the automobile passes, the rights
and liabilities of the parties which stem from their guest-host relationship should
remain constant and not vary and shift as the automobile proceeds from place to
place." Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
"' Fuerste v. Bemis, - Iowa -, 156 N.W.2d 831 (1968) ; Wessling v. Paris,
417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d
526 (1966); Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969); Clark v. Clark,
107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 61, 133
N.W.2d 408 (1965). But see Friday v. Smoot, - Del. -, 211 A.2d 594 (1965),
in which Delaware reaffirmed the application of lex loci to guest statute cases.
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the guest statute situation is like any other tort situation and should not
be singled out for separate attention.
Wrongful Death Cases
Wrongful death litigation presents another area that may be treated
separately although basically it is just one facet of the whole tort matrix.
As in other tort situations, there has been some trend away from the lex
loci rule, which traditionally was given almost unanimous application to
determine wrongful death liability, including the measure of and limita-
tions on damages.'-' Standing almost alone, Iowa as early as 1905 held
that damages for foreign torts were to be assessed in accordance with the
law of the Iowa forum."'
In Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,"19 a 1961 New York suit for
the death of a New Yorker in a plane crash in Massachusetts, the court,
by way of dicta, announced that though the cause of action was based on
the Massachusetts death statute, that statute's limitation of damages was
inapplicable because damages lie within the area of procedure. Conse-
quently, the court indicated that the New York rule, under which no
limitation is imposed, should be applied.'20 To the extent that Kilberg
relied on classifying damages as "procedural," it was rejected by the
same court in a 1962 decision that reached the same result on the basis of
the interest of the State of New York in its residents.',. Other states
that have refused to impose lex loci damage limitations in wrongful death
cases in which the decedent was not domiciled in the state in which the
tort was committed are California, 22 Mississippi, 23 Pennsylvania' and
Rhode Island.'25
111Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 1180, 1185-89 (1963).
118 See Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965). In this
multiple wrongful death case that occurred in Minnesota, all the parties were resi-
dents of Iowa. The court, applying Iowa law, relied upon Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des
Moines Nat'l Bank, 127 Iowa 153, 98 N.W. 918 (1905).
" 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
120 "It is open to us .... particularly in view of our strong public policy as
to death action damages, to treat the measure of damages in this case as being a
procedural or remedial question controlled by our own State policies." Id. at 41,
172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
... Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17
(1962). Accord, Pearson v. Northeast Air Lines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
... Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
... Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968).
... Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
.. Woodward v. Stewart, - R.I. -, 243 A.2d 917 (1968).
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At least five states have recently refused to deviate from a strict
adherence to lex loci in wrongful death cases. 120  North Carolina has
long applied lex loci to wrongful death actions, 2 ' and this rule was re-
affirmed by the supreme court in 1964128 and again in 1967.129 In 1969 in
Brendle v. General Tire & Rubber Co.,' 80 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reluctantly recognized that North Carolina applies the
lex loci rule in wrongful death actions and has declined to adopt the "most
significant relationship" test. In this case, decedent Brendle, a North
Carolina resident, suffered fatal injuries in Missouri as the result of a tire
blowout while he was driving a truck for his employer, a North Carolina
corporation. The defendant tire manufacturer was incorporated and
engaged in manufacturing in Ohio and sold the allegedly defective tire
to decedent's employer in North Carolina through a North Carolina sub-
sidiary. Plaintiff, administratrix of the decedent, alleging negligent manu-
facture and breach of implied warranty of fitness for use, sued for pre-
2' Messinger v. Tom, 203 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1967); Hopkins v. Lockheed Air-
craft Corp., 201 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1967) ; McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d
1018 (1965) ; Abendschein v. Farrell, 11 Mich. App. 662, 162 N.W.2d 165 (1968) ;
Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rogers, 398 P.2d 500 (Okla. 1965); Marmon v.
Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968). See also Glick v. Ballentine
Produce, Inc., 343 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1965); Satchwill v. Vollroth Co., 293 F.
Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
127 Caldwell v. Abernethy, 231 N.C. 692, 58 S.E.2d 763 (1950); Wise v. Hollo-
well, 205 N.C. 286, 171 S.E. 82 (1933).
128 "Liability for negligence resulting in personal injury or death is determined
by the law of the state where the tort is committed." It re Scarborough, 261 N.C.
565, 567, 135 S.E.2d 529, 530 (1964).
12' Broadfoot v. Everett, 270 N.C. 429, 154 S.E.2d 522 (1967). Plaintiff, ad-
ministrator of a Maryland decedent, brought a wrongful death action against the
executrix of a North Carolina decedent. The deaths resulted from the crash in
Pennsylvania of an aircraft owned and operated by the North Carolina decedent.
Plaintiff did not qualify as ancillary administrator, nor was the wrongful death
action brought, until seventeen months after the crash. The Pennsylvania statute of
limitations was one year, and a statute permitted personal service to be made
on nonresident automobile and aircraft operators by service on the Pennsylvania
Secretary of State. The North Carolina statute of limitations is two years.
Defendant pleaded the Pennsylvania statute in bar, and a trial court judgment of
dismissal was affirmed on appeal. The court applying the "borrowing" portion of
the North Carolina statute of limitations, said:
The ancillary administrator, appointed in North Carolina for a foreign
decedent killed in Pennsylvania, is not a resident of this State within the
meaning of the proviso to G.S. 1-21; the real parties in interest have never
been residents of North Carolina .... At the time this action was instituted
here, it was barred in Pennsylvania where it arose; it is, therefore, also
barred in North Carolina.
Id. at 433, 154 S.E.2d at 526.
1.0408 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1969).
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death pain and suffering and medical expenses and for wrongful death.
Under Missouri law there is no survival of a cause of action for medical
expenses or pain and suffering if death results from the injury; further,
the proper parties-plaintiff in a wrongful death action are the decedent's
minor children. Consequently, both causes of action in tort were defective
under Missouri law. Holding that the North Carolina Supreme Court
would apply Missouri law, the district court granted summary judgment
as to both tort actions. In affirming, the court of appeals held that it was
bound to apply the North Carolina conflicts rule in a diversity case.131
Two additional cases, though technically dealing with local North
Carolina law, merit mention because of their multistate aspects. In a
1964 decision, In re Scarborough,"3 2 the state supreme court upheld the
jurisdiction of North Carolina courts to entertain a suit for wrongful
death where a nonresident decedent was killed in another state and left
no assets in North Carolina other than the cause of action for wrongful
death. A resident of Michigan had died at a motel in Laurens, South
Carolina, as the result of a defective heater. He had never resided in and
had no heirs or next of kin in North Carolina. A domiciliary admin-
istrator was appointed in Michigan. An ancillary administrator brought
"IThe opinion evidences some judicial regret regarding this obligation.
Clearly the present litigation is not an appealing one in which to apply the
lex loci rule. Missouri has no real connection with either the alleged tortious
conduct or the various parties involved in the litigation. It is the "place of
the wrong" only in the special sense that "the last event necessary to make
an actor liable" occurred in that state. The fact that the accident happened
there was completely fortuitous. No Missouri traffic law was violated, and
no Missouri resident was involved. The alleged negligence occurred in
Ohio, and any damages awarded in the suit would be paid by an Ohio
corporation. The decedent's estate is being administered in North Carolina,
where his surviving dependents reside. Therefore, whether the purpose of
tort law in this situation is to admonish the tortfeasor or to compensate
the tort victims, Missouri has no interest in having its law govern the
the case, and North Carolina has no reason to apply Missouri law rather
than its own, the law of the forum ....
Missouri's more restrictive law thus clearly conflicts with the forum
state's interest in assuring its residents, the decedent's dependents, adequate
compensation for injury or death, and yet the result of applying Missouri
law furthers no interest of that jurisdiction.
Id. at 117-18.
Use of forum law, as the appellant urges, seems by far the more reason-
able course. Unfortunately for plaintiff's contention, however, we are not
free to fashion our own choice of law rule, for we are bound by the decisions
of the North Carolina Supreme Court.
Id. at 120.
"' 261 N.C. 565, 135 S.E.2d 529 (1964).
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a wrongful death action, which was settled, in South Carolina against
three defendants. Thereafter petitioner applied in North Carolina for
letters of ancillary administration for the purpose of filing a wrongful
death action against a different defendant, an Alabama corporation having
a resident agent in Charlotte. It was held that ancillary letters should
issue and that the right of action for wrongful death is an asset with
situs in the county in which personal service can be had on the torifeasor.
The court further held that if meritorious defenses to the suit existed,
these could not prevent the appointment of an administrator.
In In re Edmundson,"3I a Maryland driver, injured in the same
North Carolina accident in which an Ohio driver was killed, had an
ancillary administrator appointed for the latter in order to bring a per-
sonal injury action. It was held that the potential right of exoneration
under a policy of automobile liability insurance covering the Ohio driver
was a sufficient asset to permit the letters to be issued in North Carolina,
provided that the insurer was subject to service of process in the state.
Loss of Consortium
Choice of substantive law to control a suit for loss of consortium does
not seem to have been presented for decision in North Carolina. This
void in North Carolina case law is not surprising since, except as a newly
recognized element of damage in a wrongful death suit,18 4 local law gives
no cause of action for loss of consortium.' Two recent cases in other
jurisdictions have held that if the injury to a spouse occurs in a state
other than that of the marital domicile, the applicable law is that of the
place of injury. In Maryland the court reached this result by applying the
traditional lex loci rule.13 6 In reaching the same result, the court in
Oregon found that the state of the injury had more significant contacts
than the state of the marital domicile.' 37 In each case recovery was denied
on the ground that no cause of action existed.
When the injury depriving a spouse of consortium occurs in another
state, North Carolina courts would probably apply lex loci and permit
.8273 N.C. 92, 159 S.E.2d 509 (1968).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §28-174 (Supp. 1969). As enacted, the statute does not
use the word "consortium," but it seems to be covered by the words that are used.
... I-elmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945).
... Hartford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bruchey, 248 Md. 669, 238 A.2d 115 (1968). See
note 55 supra.
87 Casey v. Manson Constr. and Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967).
See note 44 supra.
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recovery if the other state's law does, even if the injured spouse is not
deceased and hence the recent provision in the North Carolina wrongful
death statute would not be operative. This new provision probably estab-
lishes that North Carolina has no strong public policy against permitting
recovery for loss of consortium. It is conceivable, but unlikely, that a
North Carolina court would hold loss of consortium to occur not at the
place of injury, but at the marital domicile, and would apply North Caro-
lina law to deny recovery if the injured spouse survives. Caution might
dictate bringing the suit for loss of consortium in the state of physical
injury if its law permits such an action.
CHOICE OF CONTRACTs LAW
In general the weight of choice of law authority in the United States in
multistate contracts cases has paralleled the formulations contained in
the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws. These rules provided that
(1) the validity of a contract is governed by the local law of the place of
contracting; (2) the parties do not have power to choose the governing
law; (3) matters of performance and damages for non-performance are
governed by the local law of the place of performance; and (4) the rules
apply to the entire field of contracts.138 In Restatement (Second), these
rules have been changed so that (1) both validity and performance are
determined by the local law of the state of most significant relationship,
with the exception of details of performance, which are governed by
the local law of the place of performance; (2) the contracting parties
may choose the governing law so long as it has substantial relationship
to the transaction; and (3) certain types of contracts are carved out for
special treatment.18 9
1s8 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws, part II, comment at
180 (Proposed Official Draft May 1, 1968).
"I Provisions here relevant are:
Section 186. Applicable Law. Issues in contract are determined by the
law chosen by the parties in accordance with the rule of § 187 and otherwise
by the law selected in accordance with the rule of § 188.
Section 187. Law of the State Chosen by the Parties.
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual
rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties
could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to
that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual
rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the
parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement
directed to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties
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The "most significant contacts" approach to choice of law was
first developed not in tort, but in contract cases. 40 It is safe to say that
those states that have unqualifiedly adopted "significant contacts" or
"policy analysis" in multistate tort cases will also apply these concepts
to the resolution of multistate contract litigation.' 4 ' These states possibly
or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the
parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to
a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater
interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular
issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the
applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the
parties.
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention the reference is
to the local law of the state of the chosen law.
Section 188. Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by the Parties.
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in
contract are determined by the local law of the state which, as to that issue,
has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under
the principles stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see
§ 187), the contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of
§ 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance
are in the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied ....
Section 206. Details of Performance. Issues relating to details of per-
formance of a contract are determined by the local law of the place of
performance.
Section 189. Contracts for the Transfer of Interests in Land. The validity of
a contract for the transfer of an interest in land and the rights created there-
by are determined, in the absence of an effective choice of law by the
parties, by the local law of the state where the land is situated unless, with
respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant rela-
tionship to the transaction and the parties, in which event the local law of
the other state will be applied.
For significant academic discussions of contracts aspects of RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND), see CAvERS, RE-RESTATING THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: THE CHAPTER ON
CONTRACTS in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW, LEGAL ESSAYS
IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. YNTEMA 349 (1961); Reese, Contracts and the Restate-
inent of Conflicts of Laws, Second, 9 INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 53 (1960) ; Wein-
traub, The Contracts Proposals of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws-A
Critique, 46 IowA L. REv. 713 (1961).
"" See Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
""See Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266
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would not give finality to a law chosen by the parties, but would consider
it as a factor in determining "significant contacts" or aiding in "policy
analysis."
North Carolina contract conflicts law has not been much swayed by
Restatement (First) or (Second), and not at all by the "most significant
relationship" rule. Essentially the North Carolina rule has been, and is,
that the lex loci celebrationis (also referred to as the lex loci contractus)
-the substantive law of the state where the the last act to make a binding
conract takes place--controls all aspects of the contract.
The North Carolina authorities are collected in Fast v. Gulley,' a
1967 case holding that a contract regarding ownership of corporate stock,
entered into between a father and adult daughter in New Jersey, created
a joint tenancy with right of survivorship since this result was required
by New Jersey law.14 This case also clearly enunciates the test for de-
termining the place of the contract.
The issue of whether questions of performance are governed by the
law of the place of contracting or of the place of performance has not been
conclusively decided in North Carolina. The court raised the issue, sua
sponte, in Arnold v. Ray Charles Enterprises"' but did not resolve it.145
(1961); Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964). See also Perrin
v. Pearlstein, 314 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1963), which held that, when points of contact
are equal, resort must be had to the law of the state in which the last act necessary
to make a binding contract occurs.271 N.C. 208, 155 S.E.2d 507 (1967).
"In interpreting a contract made outside of this State our courts long ago
established the principle that the law of the country where the contract is made
is the rule by which the validity of it, its exposition, and consequences are to be
determined." Id. at 211, 155 S.E.2d at 509. See also Davis v. Davis, 269 N.C. 120,
152 S.E.2d 306 (1967); Cannaday v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 143 N.C. 439, 55
S.E. 836 (1906) (frequently cited for the propostion that the law of the place
where the contract was made governs matters of execution, interpretation, and
validity); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Jordan, 5 N.C. App. 249, 168 S.E.2d 229
(1969).
14264 N.C. 92, 141 S.E.2d 14 (1965).
1
"The contract in this case was made in New York, it was to be performed
in Virginia .... The only question of substantive law ... involves the
proper measure of damages .... Throughout, neither party has made any
reference to the law of New York or that of Virginia, yet we are required
to take judicial notice of foreign law .... It appears that the law of New
York, lex loci celebrationis, and that of Virginia, lex loci solutionis, are
no different with reference to the substantive question here involved.
There would be no profit, then, for us to exercise ourselves here to determine
which law is to be applied, for to do so would take us into a "highly
complex and confused part of the conflict of laws."
Id. at 96-97, 141 S.E.2d at 17.
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In Connor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,140 a
liability policy issued in Virginia was at issue, and the opinion is clear
that the validity of its provisions was governed by Virginia law. How-
ever, the critical issue was whether the insurer had waived, or was estopped
from invoking, the provision requiring the insured to cooperate in de-
fending a North Carolina suit. The court seems to deal with this issue
as a matter of North Carolina law, but there is neither a classification of
the issue as one of performance nor any discussion of choice of the law
of performance.
Another case in which the court is inconclusive on the issue of what
law governs questions of performance is Davis v. Davis.147 The plaintiff
wife, a North Carolina resident, instituted an action for alimony without
divorce. The defendant husband, a resident of Florida, asserted a defense
based on a separation agreement executed in Florida and in a cross action
prayed for absolute divorce. The separation agreement, valid in Florida,
did not comply with the North Carolina statutory requirement that there
be a privy examination of the wife and a certificate of the examining
officer that the contract is not "unreasonable or injurious" to her. The
court, in remanding for determination whether the separation agreement
was in fact unreasonable or injurious to the wife, said:
We are advertent to the decisions holding that, with reference to
contracts providing for performance in another state, the law of the
place of performance governs generally or as to matters relating to
performance.... Suffice to say, our research has disclosed no decision
in which the 'place of performance' rule has been applied to a separation
agreement. The separation agreement under consideration implies the
wife intended to leave Florida with the children and take up residence
in North Carolina. However, she was not required to do so; and
defendant's obligation to make the stipulated payments for her support
was general and unconditional, whether she resided in Florida, North
Carolina or elsewhere.
The conclusion reached is that the validity and construction of the
separation agreement are to be determined by the law of Florida.148
In an action for breach of warranty brought by a resident of California
against a North Carolina corporate manufacturer of gyrogliders, the
1. 265 N.C. 188, 143 S.E.2d 98 (1965). Compare Goulding v. Sands, 237 F.
Supp. 577 (W.D. Pa. 1965).147269 N.C. 120, 152 S.E.2d 306 (1967).
1
,
8 Id. at 124, 152 S.E.2d at 310.
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North Carolina Supreme Court held that whether the allegation was
actionable was to be determined on demurrer by the law of North Carolina
since the plaintiff had not pleaded any facts invoking foreign law.1 49 This
holding implies that California law would determine the adequacy of per-
formance if there in fact was a contract of sale between the parties con-
summated in California.
Perhaps the court's broad language in a colorful breach of promise
suit 0 can be applied to matters of performance and breach. Reasoning
by analogy to its conflicts rule in interspousal tort suits, the court said:
It follows that a party to a contract made in a State which denied
recovery for its breach should not be allowed to recover in another
State, although the breach occurred in the forum State, and that a
contract unenforceable in the State where it is made should not be
enforceable in the courts of this State. Thus if the alleged marriage
contract were made in the State of California, the defendant would not
have been liable.151
The interesting question whether the North Carolina Supreme Court
will apply choice of law clauses in contracts was raised in a suit seeking
to modify certain provisions of a trust instrument. 5 2 In 1924, James B.
Duke, a resident of New Jersey, executed in that state a trust instrument
transferring securities to twelve trustees for "the Duke Endowment."
The trust indenture, subscribed by Duke and the twelve designated trus-
tees, stated that it was
1 Murray v. Bensen Aircraft Corp., 259 N.C. 63-8, 131 S.E.2d 367 (1963).
0 
-utchins v. Day, 269 N.C. 607, 135 S.E.2d 132 (1967).
Id. at 612, 153 S.E.2d at 136.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that "the
North Carolina rule is that the consequences of contractual obligations entered
into and to be performed in the same state must be determined by the law of that
state." Hardy-Latham v. Wellons, 415 F.2d 674, 677 (4th Cir. 1968).
Although the matter has not been briefed by counsel, independent study
satisfies us that the North Carolina rule is that the consequences of con-
tractual obligations entered into and to be performed in the same state must
be determined by the law of that state. See Fast v. Gulley, 271 N.C. 208, 155
S.E.2d 507 (1967); Davis v. Davis, 269 N.C. 120, 152 S.E.2d 306 (1967);
Roomy v. Allstate Insurance Co., 256 N.C. 318, 123 S.E.2d 817 (1962).
In the instant case, Hunt and Barnes, both New York residents, contacted
Mrs. Hardy-Latham, another New Yorker, in that state and correctly
anticipated that her performance as well as their own would be exclusively
in the Empire State. Thus, there can be no question that it is New York's
law which governs the proper division of the $15,000 commission.
Id. 192 Cocke v. Duke Univ., 260 N .C. 1, 131 S.E.2d 909 (1963).
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executed by a resident of the State of New Jersey in said State, is
intended to be made, administered and given effect under and in
accordance with the present existing laws and statutes of said State,
notwithstanding it may be administered and the beneficiaries hereof
may be located in whole or in part in other states, and the validity and
construction thereof shall be determined and governed in all respects
by such laws and statutes.'1
The court held that it had jurisdiction to construe and modify the trust
instrument, but that in doing so it would apply the substantive law of
New Jersey. "A court called upon to supervise the administration should
have no doubt as to what law the donor intended the trustees to obey. '"'5
Apparently the court has not in express terms accepted and applied
the law selected by the parties to govern their agreement, nor has it
refused to do so. In Didke the court certainly carefully considered the
choice of law direction in the trust instrument, drew heavily upon it in
determining the intent of the donor, and proceeded to apply the designated
New Jersey law in deciding the litigation. However, that law was also
the lex loci celebrationis. Whether the North Carolina courts will approve
the Restatement (Second)'s broad permission to parties to choose the law
to govern a multistate contract1 55 remains to be seen. There is some
precedent for adopting the Restatement rule by virtue of the assertions
in North Carolina cases that lex loci celebrationis applies "in the absence
of circumstances indicating a different intention."'5 0
The enforcement of choice of law clauses specifying which law shall
govern has long been the rule in most civil law countries, and there has
been some movement in the United States in that direction. 5 7 The prin-
cipal objection is the possibility of individuals being forced into choice
of law clauses in contracts of adhesion. A distinction could be drawn
between commercial and non-commercial contracts, but such a distinction
15 3 Id. at 8, 131 S.E.2d at 913.
lu Id. at 9, 131 S.E.2d at 914.
lur RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 187 (Proposed Official
Draft, May 1, 1968).
"I Quoted from an English case in Canaday v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 143
N.C. 439, 442, 55 S.E. 836, 837 (1906). This has in turn been quoted by later North
Carolina cases. See, e.g., Fast v. Gulley, 271 N.C. 208, 211, 155 S.E.2d 507, 510
(1967).
"57 Cases approving and applying choice of law clauses are collected in RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Reporter's Note at 194-200 (Proposed
Official Draft, May 1, 1968).
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would introduce its own complications.15 Choice of law by the parties is
an area of North Carolina conflicts law apparently still open to influence
by effective advocacy of counsel, except to the extent that it is now de-
termined by the Uniform Commercial Code, which will hereafter be dis-
cussed.
The question of choice of law must be distinguished from the related
question of choice of forum. On this latter point the North Carolina rule,
except as to labor contracts, continues to follow the common law-courts
of the state may not be divested of jurisdiction by advance contractual
agreement of the parties. Arbitration clauses will not be enforced to pre-
clude direct resort to the courts," 9 unless the clauses are contained in
labor contracts 60 or unless an express agreement to arbitrate has been
made regarding a specific disagreement that has already arisen.' 6'
Choice of forum agreements purporting to select a given court to the
exclusion of all others usually are not enforced by American courts. In
the case involving the Duke Endowment, Cocke v. Dsoe University, the
North Carolina Supreme Court rejected a contention that the trust in-
strument required that it be admiinstered only in the courts of New
Jersey and proceeded to exercise jurisdiction over the controversy.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE CONFLICTS PROVISIONS
Because it contains certain built-in conflict of laws rules, the Uniform
Commercial Code merits separate examination. The North Carolina
Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to construe any of these conflicts
provisions, but this void is not surprising since the Code is effective in
North Carolina only as to transactions entered into and events occurring
on and after July 1, 1967.162 When the court is confronted with the
application of the statutory conflicts rules to sales, commercial paper, bank
deposits and collections, letters of credit, bulk transfers, warehouse receipts,
bills of lading and other documents of title, investment securities, secured
"' See Note, Commercial Security and Uniformity Through Express Stipula-
tions in Contracts as to Governing Law, 62 HARv. L. Rnv. 647 (1949).
1' Skinner v. Gaither, 234 N.C. 385, 67 S.E.2d 267 (1951) ; MeDonough Constr.
Co. v. Hanner, 232 F. Supp. 887 (M.D.N.C. 1964).0N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-36.8 (1965).
1 Poe v. University of N.C., 248 N.C. 617, 104 S.E.2d 189 (1958).
12 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-10-101 (1965); Yates v. Brown, 275 N.C. 634, 642,
170 S.E.2d 477, 483 (1969); Bailie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp., 4 N.C.
App. 342, 167 S.E.2d 85 (1969); Southern Nat'l Bank v. Universal Acceptance
Corp., 2 N.C. App. 3.19, 321, 163 S.E.2d 10, 12 (1968). See generally Symposiwm,-
The Uniform Commercial Code in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L. REv. 525 (1966) for
a comprehensive presentation of the substantive provisions of the Code.
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transactions, and the consensual relationships controlled by the Code, de-
cisions may be somewhat different than would be the case without this
statutory direction.
A primary objective of the Code is to achieve uniformity of decision
in all American jurisdictions as to matters covered by it.'03 If this goal
were fully accomplished, there would be little need for court-made con-
flicts rules in commercial cases covered by the Code, at least so far as
domestic transactions are concerned. Conflicts problems would still arise
as to transnational commercial transactions in situations in which
international practice is not uniform. As a practical matter there will
continue to be a divergence of results even among the states of the
United States because an identical text of the Code has not been adopted
in all states. At any rate, inevitably there will be disagreement among
courts even in applying identical language." 4 The Comments, both
"Official" and "North Carolina," accompanying the Code and its inte-
gral conflicts provisions, are intended to minimize the area and number
of conflicting decisions. So far as official attitudes may be assessed, the
relationship between the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and
the Code is harmonius; each strives to complement the other. Consis-
tently, Restatement Comments either refer favorably, or completely defer,
to Code requirements. 1 5 In turn, application of Restatement principles
1 The Publisher's Note at the beginning of Chapter 25 of the General Statutes
of North Carolina states in part:
The Comments headed "Official Comment" are the Comments of the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws and the American
Law Institute which appear in the "1962 Official Text with Comments" of
the UCC. The Comment under the title of the Act states in part:
Uniformity throughout American jurisdictions is one of the main
objectives of this Code; and that objective cannot be obtained without
substantial uniformity of construction. To aid in uniform construction
these Comments set forth the purpose of various provisions of this
Act to promote uniformity, to aid in viewing the Act as an integrated
whole, and to safeguard against misconstruction.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-1-101(2) (c) provides, "This chapter shall be liberally
construed and applied . .. to make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions.
See Reese, The Uniform Commercial Code and Its Application in Noncode States,
15 BAYLOR L. Rxv. 291 (1963).
...See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws, Comment c § 191 at
225, and Introductory Note to Topic 4, Negotiable Instruments, preceding § 214,
at 357 (Proposed Official Draft, May 1, 1968).
."Id., Reporter's Note § 187(2), at 199; Reporter's Note § 188, at 214; Com-
ment c § 191, at 225; Comment d § 191, at 226; Comment d § 205, at 311; Intro-
ductory Note §208, at 328; Comment g §210, at 342; Comment b §211, at
345; Comment f § 211, at 348; Introductory Note § 214, at 357; Comment f § 214,
at 363; Comment g §215 at 371.
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is left open to the courts by the Code provision that "[u]nless displaced
by the particular provisions of this chapter, the principles of law and
equity.. . shall supplement its provisions."' 66 As Code problems arise in
North Carolina, conflicts decisions from other Code jurisdictions may be
very persuasive because of the aspiration for uniformity, but they are not
binding on the North Carolina courts.
The basic conflicts section of the North Carolina version of the
Code 67 does three things. First, it permits the parties to a transaction,
"I N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-103 (1965) reads:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this chapter, the principles
of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation,
duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating
cause shall supplement its provisions.
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-105 (1965) provides:
(1) Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears
a reasonable relation to this State and also to another state or nation the
parties may agree that the law either of this State or of such other state
or nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this
chapter applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this State.
(2) Where one of the following provisions of this chapter specifies the
applicable law, that provision governs and a contrary agreement is effective
only to the extent permitted by the law (including the conflict of laws rules)
so specified:
Rights of creditors against sold goods, § 25-2-402.
Applicability of the article on bank deposits and collections, § 24-4-102.
Bulk transfers subject to the article on bulk transfers, § 25-6-102.
Applicability of the article on investment securities, § 25-8-106.
Policy and scope of the article on secured transactions, §§ 25-9-102 and
25-9-103.
For a pessimistic view of both the wisdom and efficacy of the effort to promote
conflicts uniformity, see Weintraub, Choice of Law For Products Liability: The
Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code And Recent Developments In Conflicts
Analysis, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 1429 (1966). Professor Weintraub believes it is
inappropriate to permit buyers to accede, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, to a choice
of lav provision selecting a substantive law denying products liability recovery
against manufacturers. He urges that a court should be free to engage in state-
interest analysis in making its choice of law. Using three hypotheticals, he de-
velops the thesis that if the law of any state having any reasonable relationship to
the transaction permits implied warranty or strict tort liability recovery, that law
should be applied to give judgment for plaintiff in products liability litigation.
See generally Nordstrom & Ramerman, The Uniform Commercial Code and
the Choice of Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 623. This article starts with this synopsis:
The choice of laws provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code often have
been critcized on the basis that they are forum oriented, so forum oriented
that their constitutionality may be questionable. The authors of this article
analyze the basic Code choice of law section (UCC § 1-105) and conclude
that this section need not be read with the heavy emphasis on the forum's
version of the Code as suggested by some other writers. Instead, the argu-
ment is made that the Code's choice of law principles permit development
in accordance with the forum's general notion of choice of law. Addi-
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which has a "reasonable relation" to North Carolina and also to another
state or nation, to agree that the law of either shall govern. Second, if no
such choice of law is agreed upon in a transaction that has an "appropriate
relation" to North Carolina, the substantive provisions of the North
Carolina Code apply. Third, certain transactions are governed by specific
sections, and in some of these a rigid conflicts rule is prescribed.
The first provision is a statutory recognition that parties to trans-
actions may, within limits, expressly choose the substantive law to govern
tionally, the Code can provide impetus for complete acceptance of party
autonomy in selecting the system of law which will govern the rights and
duties of the parties to a contract.
Id. at 623. The authors conclude:
The Code, with one of the most comprehensive choice of law statutes yet
enacted, seeks to retain certainty for the parties by allowing agreement as
to the law which will govern the transaction, subject only to the requirement
that the transaction have a "reasonable relation" to the state whose laws
are chosen-often a requirement of little impact because businessmen simply
do not choose to have their transactions governed by laws that are strange
to them. Undoubtedly, the portion of the statutory grant of party autonomy
which will have the greatest impact on policing choice of law clauses is
the requirement that the parties "agree" on the clause. Here, common law
contract notions of subjective and objective mutual assent will continue
to play their role.
Id. at 645.
One writer has flatly stated that "the Uniform Commercial Code as presently
operative fails to achieve the goals of uniformity its authors originally hoped it
would." Hintze, Disparate Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code-The
Need for Federal Legislation, 1969 UTAH L. R.v. 722, 742.
Federal commercial paper is not subject to the dictates of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 304 F. Supp. 955
(E.D. Pa. 1969), allowing the government recovery from the bank on a forged
treasury check, the court said:
[U]nder the Uniform Commercial Code... this is a "padded payroll case"
and the loss, if the plaintiff were not the Government, would fall on the
employer whose agent presented the padded payroll. UCC § 3-405(1) (c)
However, the Supreme Court held in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363 . . . (1943) that pursuant to the federal currency
powers, legal questions involved in controversies over federal commercial
paper are to be resolved by the application of federal common law rather
than state law. . . . Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court . . .
have held in situations very close to the instant one that the loss must
fall on the bank rather than the Government .... [D]efendant contends,
. . . since the Uniform Commercial Code has been revised to include the
padded payroll cases, and since nearly all the states have adopted the
Code, we should in the interest of uniformity adopt that rule for federal
paper as well ....
[T]he rationale of Clearfield was not uniformity but "preservation of
the federal right" . . . .
Id. at 956. See also United States v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n,
288 F. Supp. 343 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
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their agreement. The statute does not expressly spell out what the word
"transactions" means. Conceivably, it could be read to extend to all
consensual transactions even if they are not within the scope of the Code.
At least this question seems to have been left open for adjudication. How-
ever, in view of the further Code statement that "[f]ailing such agree-
ment this chapter applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation
to this State,""' it seems clear that the intent of the Code's drafters is to
prescribe the conflicts rule only for transactions substantively governed by
the Code itself. Thus, it is possible that, depending upon whether the
agreement is or is not governed by the Code, North Carolina could de-
velop two different rules as to choice of law in contracts. Nevertheless,
uniformity as to basic rules seems desirable.
The Code does not permit unlimited choice of law. If all parties and
all elements of the transaction are North Carolina-contained, there seems
to be no warrant in the statute for enforcing a contract term that the
law of Utah, or Argentina, shall govern. The same result would seem
to be true if the transaction had reasonable relationship to North Car-
olina, Virginia, and Tennessee, but not to Utah or Argentina. How-
ever, the Official Comment following North Carolina General Statutes
section 25-1-105 states:
Ordinarily the law chosen must be that of a jurisdiction where a
significant enough portion of the making or the performance of the
contract is to occur or occurs. But an agreement as to choice of
law may sometimes take effect as a shorthand expression of the in-
tent of the parties as to matters governed by their agreement, even
though the transaction has no significant contact with the jurisdiction
chosen.' 69
Does this mean that when a contract has reasonable relations only with
North Carolina and California, the court should enforce a term to the
effect that all disputes shall be resolved by arbitration in the same manner
as if the New York arbitration statue applied? Probably so, if meaning
is given to the language of the Official Comment, even though section
25-1-105 itself does not provide for this result. The example is compli-
cated by the fact that North Carolina has adhered to the common law
rule refusing to enforce agreements to arbitrate in futuro.170 What about
an agreement to submit to arbitration under the procedures made avail-
1
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-105(1) (1965).
' N.C. GuIN. STAT. § 25-1-105, Official Comment (1965).
..o See notes 159-61 smpra.
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able by the World Bank, a private trade association, or any other organ-
ization not a state or country? Whether such provisions are enforceable
in North Carolina under the Code remains to be seen.
Since all states except Louisiana have adopted the Code, presumably
an agreement to apply the law of North Carolina or California to a con-
tract with reasonable relations to each state would lead to the application
of the same substantive law regardless of the forum. Such uniformity
would promote the purpose of the Code. Even here, however, there may
be conflict due to differences in wording or to divergence of judicial in-
terpretation.
A definite possibility of difference in result when parties select the
substantive law arises where the transaction has a reasonable relationship
to North Carolina and any foreign country. The law of the foreign
country may differ substantially from the Code provisions, yet it would
be applicable if the parties agree to accept it. A North Carolina party is,
of course, not obliged to agree to such a choice of law. Furthermore, the
Code has drawn heavily on commercial practice as it has developed in
all countries engaging in transnational business, and there is some trend
toward world uniformity in commercial law.
Another general problem is the definition and application of the
words "reasonable relation." Is the "reasonable relation" test under
the Code the same as the "substantial relationship" and "reasonable
basis" test prescribed by section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws?17. The language is similar enough for courts to give
each test the same meaning.
By its precise language the Code limits choice of law to "this State"
or to "another state or nation." Strictly applied, this language would
prevent parties from designating the law of different states to control
different aspects of the transaction. While this limitation would perhaps
promote simplicity and uniformity, there does not seem to be any par-
ticular reason why the parties should not be permitted to select the law
of four different states to govern respectively four different aspects of
the transaction so long as each state had a reasonable relation to the
aspect that its law was selected to control.
Another situation not expressly covered by Code language is that of
the truly national contract. Suppose a New York corporate manufacturer
and a California corporate wholesaler, each qualified for and doing bus-
iness in all fifty states, enter into a single master sales contract for the
2"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187, supra note 139.
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manufacture and delivery in each state of a specified line of commod-
ities. Assume that they select the law of Nevada to govern all aspects
of the transaction. In a suit in North Carolina arising out of a sale con-
summated under the master contract by delivery in North Carolina of
commodities manufactured in North Carolina, will the law of Nevada
be applied? Does it make any difference whether the master contract
was executed in New York, Nevada, North Carolina or elsewhere? Ar-
guably, this transaction bears a reasonable relation to both North Car-
olina and Nevada, even if the contract was executed in some other stati,
There seems to be no reason why Nevada would not qualify as a state
whose law parties might select to govern the transaction. This result
would not be inconsistent with judicial conflicts doctrine applied to multi-
state contracts antecedent to the Uniform Commercial Code." 2
The second major conflicts provision of the Code is contained in
the last sentence of section 25-1-105: "Failing such agreement this chap-
ter applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this State."' 7'
Is an "appropriate" relation a greater or lesser one than a "reasonable"
relation, or in this context do the two adjectives have the same meaning?
Presumably the legislature intended to draw a distinction, but its precise
nature is not readily apparent.' 4 The Official Comment clearly says that
if the forum state's relation to the transaction is no more than that of a
disinterested forum in which a transitory cause of action has been brought,
it would not be appropriate to apply the substantive law of the forum,
particularly if the contract was made and was to be performed in places
whose law is contrary to the provisions of the Code.' Thus the Code
would seem to leave open to North Carolina courts the application of the
present rule of lex loci contractus (or, for that matter, the Restatement's
"most significant relationship" rule).
Would the fact that one of the parties was a resident of North Caro-
lina, without more, constitute an "appropriate relation" sufficient to bring
the state's substantive Code law into effect? The Official Comment fur-
ther provides: "Where a transaction has significant contacts with a state
which has enacted the Act and also with other jurisdictions, the question
what relation is 'appropriate' is left to judicial decision. In deciding
that question the court is not strictly bound by precedents established
'' See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Film Classics, 156 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1946).
17 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-105(1) (1965).
"' There is a difference between the Code and Restatement (Second). The
Restatement applies the law of the state having "the most significant" relation.
""N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-105 Official Comment (1965).
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in other contexts."'' 7  The North Carolina Comment indicates that this
language may serve to modify prior North Carolina law.177 The clear
purport of the Official Comment is an expression of hope that the courts
will promote uniformity by making a wide application of the substantive
Code provisions in any case in which such application is a matter of
discretion.1
7 8
One federal district court went so far as to cite the adoption of
section 1-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code by the Alabama Legis-
lature as a valid reason for inferring that the Supreme Court of Alabama
would change its general rule from lex loci contractus to the most sig-
nificant relationship rule." 9 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that this inference was unwarranted."O The reasoning
:L7 Id.
1177 1d. North Carolina Comment. In this connection, the Comment refers to
Roomy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 256 N.C. 318, 123 S.E.2d 817 (1961) and Davis v.
Coleman, 33 N.C. 303 (1850). Roomy involved a suit on a liability insurance
policy, a transaction not governed by the Code. Davis involved whether a note
bearing eight per cent interest, which was legal in Georgia where the loan was
made and the note given, but usurious in North Carolina, was legal. The defense
of usury is not covered by the Code. Accordingly, the observation of the com-
menators does not necessarily follow from the two cited cases. But there are many
situations where the application of the "appropriate relation" clause could result
in a change in North Carolina conflicts of law.
"'Application of the Code . . .may be justified by its comprehensiveness,
by the policy of uniformity, and by the fact that it is in large part a
reformulation and restatement of the law merchant and of the understanding
of a business community which transcends state and even national boundaries.
Compare Global Commerce Corp. v. Clark-Babbitt Industries, Inc., 239 F.2d
716, 719 (2d Cir. 1956). In particular, where a transaction is governed
in large part by the Code, application of another law to some detail of
performance because of an accident of geography may violate the commercial
understanding of the parties.
Id., Official Comment.
"' After considering the trend of decisions abandoning the "place of con-
tracting" rule, the present approach of the Restatement, and the adoption
of the significant relationship canon in the area of personal property by the
Alabama Legislature, this court concludes that the courts of Alabama would
apply the law of Alabama to the issues presented in this case .... This in-
cludes not only the general law of Alabama, but also the Alabama statute
of frauds.
Ideal Structures Corp. v. Levine Huntsville Dev. Corp., 251 F. Supp. 3, 7 (N.D.
Ala. 1966).
"'If we had this question before us as a matter of first impression, we
might follow under the district court's banner. However, the rule in Ala-
bama boasts a long and proud vintage .... Our Erie antenna is not so
sensitive that we can gauge every variant breeze of change. Forecasting the
repudiation of a fixed legal principle is not simplistic .... The choice-of-
law reference in the Uniform Commercial Code may eventually draw the
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of the appellate court is preferable. It would seem to be a strained result
to depart from lex loci contractus and to adopt "significant contacts"
on the basis of Code section 1-105 alone, 81 particularly since the word
"significant" nowhere appears in that section.'
Subsection (2) of section 1-105'8 expressly limits the right of the
parties to choose the applicable law as to certain substantive issues. 8
For example, in cases involving sales agreements creditors of the seller
are subject to the buyer's rights to recover the goods as provided by
sections 2-402 and 2-716 of the Code unless the retention of possession
by the seller is, as against the creditor, fraudulent under any law of the
state in which the goods are situated. This exception does not apply
if the retention of possession is in good faith by a merchant-seller in
the current course of trade for a commercially reasonable time.'88 Ex-
pressly preserved are the rights of secured creditors of sellers provided for
in Article 9 of the Code. Also expressly preserved are creditors' rights
to recover when retention is not in the current course of trade and is a
Alabama courts into a general application of the "most significant relation-
ship" test, but this prediction cannot approach inevitability.
Ideal Structures Corp. v. Levine Huntsville Dev. Corp., 396 F.2d 917, 921 (5th
Cir. 1968).
1. However, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has stated:
Our recently adopted Uniform Commercial Code . . . recognizes an
"appropriate relations" test for determining applicable law, and the official
Uniform Commercial Code comments refers to a transaction's "significant
contacts" as being factors in the choice of law. This in itself indicates
legislative approval of the Restatement rule of "most significant relation-
ship."
Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 630, 133 N.W.2d 408, 415 (1965). A similar
view is expressed in Nordstrom & Ramerman, The Uniform Commercial Code
and the Choice of Law, 1969 DuxE L.J. 623, 646, which states:
[C]ases ... in which parties have not agreed on applicable law, will present
the hardest problems of statutory interpretation . . . . The "appropriate
relation" test frees the court from the narrow tests of prior Code versions
such as place of making or performance and allows it to adopt choice of law
rules resting on rational foundations. Furthermore, the Code may someday
form the base from which choice of law principles can be enunciated in non-
commerical areas.
... Relevant here is RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAwS, comment c§203, at 295 (Proposed Official Draft, Part II, May 1, 1968), which reads: "As
here used, the term, 'substantial relationship' bears a different meaning than that
attributed to 'most significant relationship' in § 188. As to a particular issue,
a contract may have a 'substantial relationship' to two or more states; it can
have its 'most significant relationship' to only one." Although section 203 deals
with usury, the comment appears to have general validity.
'8' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-105(2) (1965).
184 See note 167 supra.
...N C. GEN. STAT. §§25-2-402(1), (2) (1965).
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fraudulent transfer or preference under the law of the state in which
the goods are situated.'86
Article 4 of the Code deals with bank deposits and collections. It
expressly states that its provisions prevail over article 3, which governs
commercial paper, but that article 8, which controls investment securities,
prevails over article 4.18t Thus the Code establishes some fixed internal
conflicts rules.
Article 4 also provides that a bank's liability for action or non-action
on any item handled for purposes of presentment, payment, or collection
is governed by the law of the situs of the bank or its branch or separate
office.' 88 This provision applies to each step of the collection process.
If action or non-action of sub-agents is involved, vicarious liability of
the bank is determined by the law of the state of the location of the prin-
cipal bank. 89 The Official Comment states that it is imperative that one
law govern the activities of one office of a bank, that the basic duty of a
collecting bank is one of good faith and ordinary care, and that parties
to an ambulatory instrument must know that action will be taken with
respect to it in other jurisdictions.
The Code rules regarding bank deposits and collections may be
varied by agreement, except that a bank may not disclaim or limit its
liability for lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care. The
parties may be agreement, however, determine the standards by which the
bank's responsibility is to be measured if such standards are not mani-
festly unreasonable. 90 Federal Reserve regulations, clearing house rules,
and the like compose a part of such agreements whether or not specifically
assented to by all parties interested. 91 Banks have security interests in
collection items to the extent to which credit given for them has been
withdrawn. Subject to the provisions of article 9 of the Code,912 no
security agreement is necessary to enforce such security interests.
"Bulk transfers," as distinguished from other transfers specified in
section 6-103, are subject to the provisions of article 6, and the parties
may not by agreement deviate therefrom. 98
With respect to securities transactions, the Code provides that "[t] he
oId. § 25-2-402(3).
"'I Id. § 25-4-102 (1).
'"Id. § 254-102(2).
Id.
19 Id. § 25-4-103(1).
Id. § 25-4-103 (2).
o Id. § 25-4-208.198Id. § 25-6-102(4).
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section 9-103.1~s This latter section in subparagraph (1) states that the
validity and perfection of a security interest in an account or contract
is governed by the law (including conflict of laws rules) of the juris-
diction in which the assignor maintains the office in which he keeps records
concerning the account or contract. Subparagraph (2) specifies that the
validity and perfection of a security interest in intangibles or equipment
normally used in more than one jurisdiction are governed by the law
(including the conflict of laws rules) of the chief place of business of the
debtor. Subparagraph (3) covers in detail the problem of other incoming
goods already subject to a security interest in another jurisdiction. It
108 Id. § 25-9-103.
(1) If the office where the assignor of accounts or contract rights keeps his
records concerning them is in this State, the validity and perfection of a
security interest therein and the possibility and effect of proper filing is
governed by this article; otherwise by the law (including the conflict of laws
rules) of the jurisdiction where such office is located.
(2) If the chief place of business of a debtor is in this State, this article
governs the validity and perfection of a security interest and the possibility
and effect of proper filing with regard to general intangibles or with regard
to goods of a type which are normally used in more than one jurisdiction
(such as automotive equipment, rolling stock, airplanes, road building equip-
ment, commercial harvesting equipment, construction machinery and the
like) if such goods are classified as equipment, or classified as inventory by
reason of their being leased by the debtor to others. Otherwise, the law
(including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction where such chief
place of business is located shall govern ....
(3) If personal property other than that governed by subsections (1) and
(2) is already subject to a security interest when it is brought into this
State, the validity of the security interest in this State is to be determined
by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction where
the property was when the security interest attached. However, if the parties
to the transaction understood at the time that the security interest attached
that the property would be kept in this State and it was brought into this
State within 30 days after the security interest attached for purposes other
than transportation through this State, then the validity of the security
interest in this State is to be determined by the law of this State ....
(4) Notwithstanding subsections (2) and (3), if personal property is
covered by a certificate of title issued under a statute of this State or any
other jurisdiction which requires indication on a certificate of title of any
security interest in the property as a condition of perfection, then the per-
fection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction which issued the certificate.
(5) Notwithstanding subsection (1) and § 25-9-302, if the office where the
assignor of accounts or contract rights keeps his records concerning them is
not located in a jurisdiction which is a part of the United States, its territories
or possessions, and the accounts or contract rights are within the juris-
diction of this State or the transaction which creates the security interest
otherwise bears an appropriate relation to this State, this article governs the
validity and perfection of the security interest and the security interest may
only be perfected by notification to the account debtor.
See also Id. § 25-9-401 dealing with place of filing.
[Vol. 48
1970] CHOICE OF LAW RULES 289
validity of a security and the rights and duties of the issuer with respect
to registration or transfer are governed by the law (including the con-
flict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction of organization of the issuer. '" 194
The Official Comment states that the purpose of this language is to
prescribe a specific conflicts rule that is in accordance with the prevailing
case law. The parties are prohibited from designating by agreement that
the law of another jurisdiction may govern.195 The specific reference to
conflicts rules requires the use of partial renvoi; that is, a court is to
look to the conflicts rule rather than exclusively to the substantive law
of the jurisdiction whose law is controlling.
Also apparently invoking partial renvoi is section 1-105(2), which
provides that if the Act in certain sections "specifies the applicable law,
that provision governs and a contrary agreement is effective only to the
extent permitted by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) so
specified .. ."196
These provisions seem to run counter to the generally accepted view
that renvoi has no application to contracts matters and to the feeling
that conflicts reference should be directly to the substantive contract law
of the other jurisdiction. The parenthetical language" (including the
conflict of laws rules)" does not confine its sweep to conflicts rules pre-
scribed by Code sections and is broad enough to embrace the general
conflicts law of a jurisdiction. Hence it is conceivable that a matter might
again be subjected to the general conflicts test that the parties may choose
their own substantive law if it has any reasonable relationship to the
transaction. This result could to some extent curtail the objective of uni-
formity of result. In any event, the parenthetical reference to conflicts
rules makes final identification of applicable substantive law a more
complex problem than it would otherwise be.
The final area in which the Code prescribes specific conflicts rules is
that of secured transactions. The provisions of article 9 apply to all
security interests created by contract in any personal property and fixtures
within the jurisdiction of the Code state, including pledge, assignment,
chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's lien, equipment trust,
conditional sale, title retention contract and lease, or consignment in-
tended as security.19 7 Excepted from this general provision are multiple
state transactions to the extent that they are otherwise provided for in
19, Id. § 25-8-106.19 Id. § 25-1-105 (2).
105 Id.
1 7 Id. § 25-9-102.
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seems that in these particulars the parties may not agree upon choice of
law, no matter how reasonable the relation of that law may be, unless
such choice is permitted by the conflicts law of the non-forum jurisdic-
tion designated by the Code.
The resolution of conflicts problems under the Code's "solutions" is
by no means easy. Since all but one state has adopted the Code, however,
if judges strive to obtain uniformity of result by applying the substantive
rules of the Code whenever possible, the end product may be salutary.
Whether those who oppose uniformity of result in the resolution of
conflicts questions will train their sights against the Code's objective
remains to be seen. The tentative conclusion emerges that even the skillful
drafting of the conflicts provisions of the Code has not eliminated conflict
of laws questions and may raise new ones for resolution by the courts.
FEDERAL TAX MATTERS
In Bank v. Wells,'99 a case of first impression in North Carolina,
the North Carolina Supreme Court enunciated a new conflicts rule. The
decedent died domiciled in Nevada and, pursuant to a general power of
appointment, devised to North Carolina residents certain real property
situated in North Carolina and administered under a North Carolina
trust. The will contained no express direction regarding apportionment
of estate taxes, and the Nevada executor and two ancillary administrators
from North Carolina sued one of the appointees to have him pay a pro-rata
share of the federal estate tax. The court first upheld the constitutionality
of section 2207 of the Internal Revenue Code, which entitled the plain-
tiffs to recover the tax. While the court could have based its decision on
this holding alone, it proceeded to state a conflicts rule allowing the
plaintiffs to prevail under the Nevada apportionment statute:
When questions of apportionment of estate taxes arise in courts of a
state of the situs of a trust whose assets are includible in decedent's
gross estate for tax purposes, the law of the situs refers to the law of
decedent's domicile to resolve the questions 200
In reaching this result the court adopted the New York conflicts rule.
201
... 267 N.C. 276, 148 S.E.2d 119 (1966).
200 Id. at 287, 148 S.E.2d at 126, quoting from Doetsch v. Doetsch, 312 F.2d 323
(7th Cir. 1963).
201 In re Gato's Estate, 276 App. Div. 651, 97 N.Y.S.2d 171, aff'd, 301 N.Y.
653, 93 N.E.2d 924 (1950).
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CRIMINAL LAW
The usual rule is that, apart from granting extradition in a proper
case or providing cooperative procedures under reciprocal statutes, one
state will not enforce the penal laws of another state. In the 1963 case of
In re Donnelly,202 the petitioner, a North Carolina resident, was arrested
in South Carolina for drunk driving and posted a fifty-dollar bond that
was forfeited. No warrant was issued. Under North Carolina law a
resident's license may be suspended upon notice of his conviction in an-
other state of an offense that, if committed in North Carolina, would be
grounds for suspension. 0 3 Forfeiture of bail, not vacated, is equivalent
to a conviction.'" Under North Carolina law, however, there can be
no valid forfeiture of bail unless a warrant has been issued.20°  South
Carolina law holds that no warrant is necessary."' In restoring petitioner's
license the court held that a North Carolina driver's license can be
suspended only in accordance with the law of North Carolina, both statu-
tory and decisional, and that in this case there was no judicially cog-
nizable forfeiture of bail.
The Department of Motor Vehicles contended that the finding of the
North Carolina Superior Court that petitioner had committed an offense
in South Carolina was sufficient to sustain the license suspension. The
court rejected this argument:
The statutes do not contemplate a suspension or revocation of license
by reason of a conviction in North Carolina of an alleged offense
committed beyond its borders. In criminal matters the courts of North
Carolina have no original extraterritorial jurisdiction.207
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASES
In Rice v. Uwharrie Council Boy Scouts of America,20 an injury to
a Boy Scout executive while he was officially engaged in deep sea fishing
on the high seas off Jekyll Island, Georgia, was held compensable under
the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act. The court based its
260 N.C. 375, 132 S.E.2d 904 (1963), noted in 42 N.C.L. RP v. 623 (1964).
"I N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-23 (1965).
.
0 Id. § 20-24(c).
. In re Wright, 228 N.C. 301, 45 S.E.2d 370 (1947), aff'd on rehearing, 228
N.C. 584, 46 S.E.2d 696 (1948).
200 State v. Langford, 223 S.C. 20, 73 S.E.2d 854 (1952).
207 260 N.C. at 382, 132 S.E.2d at 908. But cf. Parks v. Howland, 4 N.C. App.
197, 166 S.E.2d 701 (1969).
208 263 N.C. 204, 139 S.E.2d 223 (1964), followed in Martin v. Georgia-Pacific
Corp., 5 N.C. App. 37, 167 S.E.2d 790 (1969).
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decision on these facts: the contract of employment was made in North
Carolina, the plaintiff was a North Carolina resident, the defendant Boy
Scout Council maintained a place of business in North Carolina, and
the employment contract was not expressly for services to be performed
exclusively outside of North Carolina °.20  The defendant contended that
the exclusive remedy of the plaintiff was under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Act. 1 The court rejected this contention and pointed
out that the Act is applicable only if recovery under workmen's com-
pensation may not be had under state law.2 11 The court held that the
proper forum is the North Carolina Industrial Commission. "The claim
does not arise under Maritime Law, but under an employment contract
made in North Carolina by residents of that State. 21 2 This characteriza-
tion of the cause of action as one of "employment contract" is consistent
with the previous practice of the court in Workmen's Compensation Act
cases.
213
FAMILY LAW
Remaining for consideration in the vast choice of law arena is the
important cluster of family law problems with multistate aspects.
Divorce Jurisdiction
North Carolina adheres to the rule, supported by the great weight of
authority, that jurisdiction to grant a divorce is predicated upon the
minimum requirement that one of the parties be a domiciliary of the
state. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that military per-
sonnel must meet this requirement214 despite a 1959 statute providing
that in a divorce action "allegation and proof that the plaintiff or the
defendant has resided . . . pursuant to military duty within this State
-o0 263 N.C. at 206, 132 S.E.2d at 226, applying N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-36
(1965).
210 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
263 N.C. at 206, 139 S.E.2d at 225.
.. Id. at 206, 139 S.E.2d at 225-26.
" E.g., Warren v. Dixon & Christopher Co., 252 N.C. 534, 114 S.E.2d 250(1960).
... Martin v. Martin, 253 N.C. 704, 118 S.E.2d 29 (1961). The court said:
The court should have instructed the jury upon the issue of residence
that the burden is on plaintiff to satisfy the jury: (1) that plaintif- was
stationed on the Fort Bragg military reservation for six months next
preceding the institution of the action, and (2) that during said period
plaintiff had the intention to make North Carolina his permanent home or to
live there indefinitely.
Id. at 711, 118 S.E.2d at 34.
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for a period of six months . . . shall constitute compliance with the resi-
dence requirements set forth in this chapter .... "215
In at least three states the conclusion has been reached that similar
statutes do dispense with domicile of military personnel as a jurisdictional
requirement for granting divorces.2 1 6 These holdings have not been sub-
jected to scrutiny by the United States Supreme Court, which has not
departed from its ruling in the celebrated Williams v. North Carolina2 17
cases that domicile is a requisite fact for the exercise of divorce jurisdic-
tion.
Interesting facets of divorce jurisdiction over military personnel were
raised in Rector v. Rector.21 Plaintiff, a serviceman, was married to
defendant, a German national, in Germany in 1964. Plaintiff was trans-
ferred to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and, before November 4, 1967, he
and his wife purchased a home in nearby Fayetteville. On that date they
separated, and defendant continued to live in the house. In March 1968,
plaintiff transferred his interest in the house to defendant. Plaintiff sued
defendant for divorce on grounds of adultery. The jury found that
plaintiff had not been a resident of North Carolina for six months but that
defendant had been, and the divorce was granted. Plaintiff had testified
that defendant intended her residence to be in Fayetteville and that she
had never expressed any desire or intent to return to Germany to live.
Defendant appealed, contending that she could not be domiciled in North
Carolina since it had been found that her husband was not domiciled
there. The divorce was affirmed, the court of appeals holding that a wife
may acquire a domicile apart from that of her husband, and that the non-
domiciled husband, as a plaintiff, may assert the North Carolina domicile
of the wife to establish divorce jurisdiction.
Recognition of Foreign Divorces
The Williams rule that a divorce decree granted by another state may
be collaterally attacked by proving that neither party was in fact domiciled
in the granting state has been greatly restricted. Later Supreme Court
cases have held that if both parties appeared in the original proceeding,
"'
5N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-18 (1966).
"' Wheat v. Wheat, 229 Ark. 842, 318 S.W.2d 793 (1958) ; Wallace v. Wallace,
63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958); Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d
807 (1959).
... Williams v. State, 220 N.C. 445, 17 S.E.2d 769 (1941), rev'd, 317 U.S.
287 (1942); Williams v. State, 224 N.C. 183, 29 S.E.2d 744 (1944), aff'd, 325
U.S. 226 (1945). See Recognition of Foreign Divorces, pp. 294-97 infra.
"' 4 N.C. App. 240, 166 S.E.2d 492 (1969).
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the finding of domicile becomes res judicata and may not be collaterally
attacked even if the issue of domicile was not in fact contested. 19 Difficult
questions can arise as to what constitutes an appearance and whether
the moving party is estopped from denying the validity of the decree that
his representations induced.
In Donnell v. Howell,22° the plaintiff wife, a domiciliary of North
Carolina, obtained a one-day divorce in Alabama by falsely alleging and
testifying that she was a resident of Alabama. The defendant husband,
also a North Carolina domiciliary, in propria persona filed an answer
waiving all notice and admitting that plaintiff was domiciled in Alabama,
but did not appear at the trial or otherwise participate in the proceeding.
In a subsequent action in North Carolina for a partition sale of real estate
owned by the spouses, both stipulated that they had perpetrated a fraud
on the Alabama court. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that
this stipulation of fact rendered the Alabama divorce void under the local
law of Alabama and that in holding the decree void the court was giving
it the same faith and credit it would receive in Alabama. No petition for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was filed.
In Thrasher v. Thrasher,"' the North Carolina Court of Appeals
upheld a Massachusetts divorce decree and held that the Massachusetts
court's finding of domicile of the plaintiff was res judicata. The court
of appeals said that if, as the plaintiff testified in the North Caro-
lina action, her Massachusetts testimony was perjured, it constituted
intrinsic fraud and could not be asserted to destroy the Massachu-
setts court's finding of jurisdictional fact. The husband and wife
and three children had been domiciled in England. The wife went
to Massachusetts and obtained a divorce. At the divorce hearing she
testified that she was domiciled in Massachusetts. The defendant husband
did not personally appear, but was served with process and was repre-
sented at the trial by counsel. The Massachusetts decree ordered the
husband to pay six hundred dollars a month to the wife for her support
and for that of the children. Later the wife and children moved to Ashe-
ville, North Carolina, and the wife brought an action for permanent ali-
mony, custody of the children, counsel fees, and alimony pendente lite.
" Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581
(1951); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343(1948).
22257 N.C. 175, 125 S.E.2d 448 (1962). Accord, Day v. Day, 237 Md. 229,
205 A.2d 798 (1965).
2214 N.C. App. 534, 167 S.E.2d 549 (1969).
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Personal service was obtained on the husband in North Carolina. The
trial court awarded the plaintiff one thousand dollars a month support
pendente lite and one thousand dollars attorney fees. Asserting that
the court was without jurisdiction because of the Massachusetts divorce,
the husband moved to vacate the judgment. In resisting this motion the
wife testified that she had obtained the Massachusetts divorce under
coercion by the husband, that the attorney she had used had really repre-
sented the husband, that she and her husband were both residents of
England at the time, and that her testimony that she was domiciled in
Massachusetts was false.
The trial court held that the Massachusetts decree was void and
reaffirmed its pendente lite order. The court of appeals reversed. It held
that unless the plaintiff was presently married to the defendant she was
not entitled to support pendente lite. The court distinguished Donnell and
held that under the controlling federal cases the Massachusetts divorce was
entitled to full faith and credit. The opinion in Thrasher provides a
valuable discussion of the requirements of full faith and credit, not only
as to sister state divorce decrees, but also as to foreign judgments.
The court in Thrasher, without expressly using the label, in fact
relied in part upon the doctrine of estoppel-that the moving party to
a divorce action may not later impeach the decree so obtained. 2 In both
Thrasher and Donnell the defendant husband did participate to some
extent in the questioned divorce proceeding. However, in Donnell the
court said:
Although the parties . . . are in pari delicto the court will grant
relief . . . if its forbearance will be productive of an offense against
public morals. . . . If a court should forbear to grant relief ... in
the face of their stipulation ... that the final divorce decree ... was
secured by the perpetration of a fraud upon the Alabama court, it
would be an offense against public morals .... 228
It is, apparently, the stipulation of fraud by both parties, as distinguished
from its unilateral assertion, that eliminates estoppel to deny the validity
of the decree. But does this distinction dispose of full faith and credit?
" Sears v. Sears, 293 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y.
355, 26 N.E.2d 290 (1940); McIntyre v. McIntyre, 211 N.C. 698, 191 S.E. 507
(1937). See Weiss, A Flight on the Fantasy of Estoppel in Foreign Divorce, 50
COLuTm. L. R v. 409 (1950); Note, Enforcement by Estoppel of Divorce Without
Domicile: Toward a Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, 61 HARv. L. RBv. 326(1948).
22 257 N.C. at 185, 125 S.E.2d at 455.
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Perhaps a better factual distinction is that in Thrasher the defendant
appeared by counsel, thus causing the jurisdictional fact of domicile to
become res judicata, whereas in Donnell the defendant's only participation
in the proceeding was to file an answer in propria persona. The question
remains, however, whether this latter factual situation removes a decree
from the full faith and credit mandate of the federal cases. Filing an
answer would seem to constitute an appearance. How much in propria
persona activity may a party engage in before res judicata attaches? It
appears that under Donnell some room is left for effective advocacy but
that Thrasher is probably more typical of jurisprudence in this area.
Support and Alimony
It is difficult to separate problems of support and alimony from those
of custody, but there are jurisdictional differences that make the effort to
do so desirable. The basic rule is that an ex parte proceeding upon sub-
stituted service of process is sufficient to confer jurisdiction to grant a
divorce to a domiciled plaintiff, but that, unless the defendant enters a
general appearance, substituted service will not sustain an in personam
judgment awarding alimony or support or adjudicating rights in property
not within the territorial jurisdiction.224 This so-called doctrine of
"divisible divorce" is recognized in North Carolina.
In Fleek v. Fleek, 5 the wife, a domiciliary of North Carolina, in-
stituted a divorce action by publication and by mailing copies of the sum-
mons and complaint to the defendant at his last known addresses in both
Switzerland and Italy. Defendant did not respond. A judgment was
entered granting plaintiff an ex parte divorce and custody of the two
children of the marriage. Plaintiff then moved that defendant be ordered
to pay one thousand dollars a month support for the children and pub-
lished notice of the motion and mailed copies of it to the defendant.
Through counsel the defendant then entered a special appearance and
moved to quash service and to dismiss plaintiff's motion upon the ground
that the court was without jurisdiction to enter an in personam judgment.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the supreme court
affirmed.
"'Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Armstrong v. Armstrong,
350 U.S. 568 (1955); Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948); Estin v. Estin,
334 U.S. 541 (1948).
- 270 N.C. 736, 155 S.E.2d 290 (1967), noted critically in 47 N.C.L. REv. 437,
441 (1969), in which the writer asserts that "the expansion of the concept of
personal jurisdiction to the limits of fairness and reason" would include this situa-
tion.
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The plaintiff contended that service by publication would support the
requested order under North Carolina General Statutes section 1-98.2 (3)
(1953), which provides: "Service of process by publication or service of
process outside the State may be had . . . for any other relief involving
the domestic status of the person to be served ... " In rejecting this
assertion the court said:
The plaintiff was a resident of North Carolina. The parties were
married in this State and had lived here as husband and wife. Un-
doubtedly the Court bad jurisdiction of the plaintiff and of the mar-
riage status, and authority to grant the divorce. The children were
before the Court in the actual custody of the plaintiff and the Court
unquestionably had authority to award custody to her. The defendant's
domestic status as a party to the marriage (a proceeding quasi in rem)
was before the Court for adjudication. In a proper case, the Court
may acquire jurisdiction of a non-resident defendant's rights to prop-
erty in this State by attachment or by garnishment, but the Court
is without power to enter a judgment in personam unless and until
the defendant is before the Court in person, that is, by personal service
of process, or by a general appearance before the Court. The terms
of the statute relating to the "domestic status of the person to be
served" do not give the Court authority to render a personal judgment.
A judgment in personam on such service would violate due process
which requires actual notice and an opportunity to be heard.226
Until 1967 the North Carolina rule was that if in any jurisdiction a
decree of absolute divorce was entered without provision for alimony, no
subsequent alimony proceeding could be maintained. This rule put a
premium on a race to judgment in another state. In Anderson v. Ander-
son,2  for example, the wife commenced an action for alimony without
divorce in North Carolina. Thereafter, the husband obtained an ex parte
divorce in Florida with no provision for alimony and asserted this judg-
ment as a defense in the wife's pending suit. The wife moved for ali-
mony pendente lite and counsel fees. This motion was denied on the
ground that the Florida absolute divorce decree was valid and entitled to
full faith and credit. For litigation commenced after October 1, 1967,
226 270 N.C. at 738, 155 S.E.2d at 291.
""247 N.C. 269, 100 S.E.2d 504 (1957). See also Mitchell v. Mitchell, 270
N.C. 253, 154 S.E.2d 71 (1967). Compare Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416
(1956); Rymanowski v. Rymanowski, - R.I. -, 249 A.2d 407 (1969), noted in
48 N.C.L. Rav. 100 (1969); Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1378 (1953).
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this unhappy situation has been rectified as to foreign divorce decrees by
the following provision:
(a) After a judgment of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, all
rights arising out of the marriage shall cease and determine except...
(d) A divorce obtained outside the State in an action in which juris-
diction over the person of the dependent spouse was not obtained
shall not impair or destroy the right of the dependent spouse to alimony
as provided by the laws of this State.2 28
Custody
Since 1967 the North Carolina rule has been that if there is a pending
divorce action, any custody proceeding must be joined with it.229 Fur-
thermore, jurisdiction of the court granting a divorce to award the custody
of unemancipated children continues after the divorce, 3 0 and a previous
custody decree rendered in a habeas corpus proceeding does not deprive
the court in which a subsequent divorce proceeding is brought of juris-
diction to hear and determine child custody." 1 Even prior to the 1967
statutory amendments, the North Carolina Supreme Court had held that
"the institution of a divorce action in this State ousts the custody juris-
diction previously obtained by a writ of habeas corpus. '22 If there is no
North Carolina divorce action pending, child custody may be awarded in
a habeas corpus proceeding.
23 3
22
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (Supp. 1969).
229 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.5(f) (1966) provides in part:
If an action for annulment, for divorce, either absolute or from bed and
board, or for alimony without divorce has been previously instituted in
this State, until there has been a final judgment in such case, any action
or proceeding for custody and support of the minor children of the marriage
shall be joined with such action or be by motion in the cause in such action.
See In re King, 3 N.C. App. 466, 165 S.E.2d 60 (1969), in which this statute was
applied.
230 Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 145 S.E.2d 332 (1965).
291 Swicegood v. Swicegood, 270 N.C. 278, 154 S.E.2d 324 (1967).
222 In re Sauls, 270 N.C. 180, 154 S.E.2d 327 (1967).
Id. at 186, 154 S.E.2d at 332. The court said:
We are constrained to believe that the legislature did not intend habeas
corpus under G.S. 17-39.1 to be used to determine custody disputes between
parents divorced in North Carolina or between whom a divorce action is
pending, but that this section provides an alternative remedy (to be used in
the judge's discretion) in other cases.
Id. Among the court's examples of "other cases" were:
In re Craigo, 266 N.C. 92, 145 S.E.2d 376 (custody of the children
of contending parents divorced outside of North Carolina awarded to the
maternal grandparents); lit re Skipper, 261 N.C. 592, 135 S.E.2d 671
(dispute over children in North Carolina between parents with divorce
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The basic rule of jurisdiction in custody proceedings has been that if
the child is physically present in the state, the court has jurisdiction to
determine and award custody.234 This power is carried forward into the
1967 statute by the provision that "[t]he courts of this State shall have
jurisdiction to enter orders providing for the custody of a minor child
when: (a) the minor child ... is physically present in this state .... "$
Moreover, the pendency in another state of a suit by one of the parents for
divorce, custody, and support does not deprive North Carolina courts of
habeas corpus jurisdiction to determine the right to custody if the
child is within the state.230
The exercise of jurisdiction to award custody based on the physical
presence of the child alone is not binding as an in personam judgment
against a nonresident parent who did not appear. The United States
Supreme Court has denied that there is in personam jurisdiction in these
circumstances, and North Carolina has expressly followed this rule.287
Not infrequently there has been a previous custody decree in another
action pending in South Carolina); Lennon v. Lennon, 252 N.C. 659,
114 S.E.2d 571 (dispute between parents, one a resident of North Carolina,
the other a nonresident divorced in Nevada).
Id. at 185, 154 S.E.2d at 332. See also In re Herring, 268 N.C. 434, 150 S.E.2d
775 (1966).
2, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 17-39.1 (1965) in pertinent part provides:
[A]ny superior court judge . . . may, in his discretion, issue a writ of
habeas corpus requiring that the body of any minor child whose custody
is in dispute be brought before him. . . . [T]he judge may award the
, * * custody of the child to such person . . . as will . .. best promote the
interest and welfare of said child.
It is not necessary that the child be domiciled in North Carolina. Presence
alone is enough. Holmes v. Sanders, 246 N.C. 200, 97 S.E.2d 683 (1957). In re
Biggers, 228 N.C. 743, 47 S.E.2d 32 (1948), indicates that if the children are
not within the state the court is without jurisdiction to award custody.
-28 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.5(c) (2) (a) (Supp. 1969).
28 litre Skipper, 261 N.C. 592, 135 S.E.2d 671 (1964).
281 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1953). In Lennon v. Lennon, 252
N.C. 659, 667, 114 S.E.2d 571, 576 (1960), the children then being present in
North Carolina, the court held:
In view of the fact that the plaintiff herein was not personally served
with summons in the State of Nevada and did not appear in said court in
person or by attorney, based on the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in May v. Anderson... we hold that the courts of North Caro-
lina are not bound by the custody decree entered in the Nevada court and
that the court below had jurisdiction to determine the custody of the
children involved in the controversy.
However, service of notice of a custody motion on an attorney of record in a
divorce proceeding where a personal appearance was made "is as valid as if
served on the party himself." Weddington v. Weddington, 243 N.C. 702, 704,
92 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1958).
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state, the children are in North Carolina, and its courts are petitioned to
change the custody prescribed by the foreign decree. A landmark case
of this type was Kovacs v. Brewer,23 in which it was originally held that
a New York decree awarding custody of a child residing in North Caro-
lina to her mother, who was domiciled in New York, was not entitled to
full faith and credit even though the North Carolina father had appeared
at the custody hearing in New York. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and held that "a custody decree is not res judicata in
New York if changed circumstances call for a different arrangement to
protect the child's health and welfare." The judgment was vacated and
remanded "to the North Carolina courts for clarification, and, if they
have not already so decided, so they may have an opportunity to determine
the issue of changed circumstances." 2 0 Death of the father before further
proceedings in North Carolina mooted both the litigation and the con-
troversy, and the child was voluntarily surrendered to the mother.2 40
In Kovacs, the United States Supreme Court clearly required a finding
of change of circumstance before it would sanction the altering of a custody
decree of another state. Later North Carolina Supreme Court cases have
recognized the necessity for findings of change of circumstance before
the provisions of an earlier custody decree in another state may be set
aside.241 The same rule is applicable in a wholly domestic setting" and
applies regardless of whether the previous custody decree was entered by
consent of the parties.243 One North Carolina Court of Appeals case has
held that, in a motion to modify a custody order, it is not necessary to
allege change of circumstances although a finding of such change would
be required before the motion could be granted. 4 Query whether in
view of Kovacs proof without pleading, or amending the pleading to
include appropriate allegations, would be permitted in a proceeding
seeking modification of a custody order issued in another state.
A word should be said regarding the situation in which the child is
2 8 245 N.C. 630, 97 S.E.2d 96 (1957).
.-1 Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 608 (1958). See also Halvey v. Halvey,
330 U.S. 610 (1947).28 Kovacs v. Brewer, 248 N.C. 742, 104 S.E.2d 882 (1958).
21 In re Marloe, 268 N.C. 458, 146 S.E.2d 441 (1966), noted in 45 N.C.L. Rv.
848 (1967) ; int re Craigo, 266 N.C. 92, 145 S.E.2d 376 (1965), noted in 44 N.C.L.
Rnv. 930 (1966).
" The authorities are collected in Elmore v. Elmore, 4 N.C. App. 192, 166
S.E.2d 506 (1969). See also Gustafson v. Gustafson, 272 N.C. 452, 158 S.E.2d
619 (1968); In re Herring, 268 N.C. 434, 150 S.E.2d 775 (1966).
.. Zande v. Zande, 3 N.C. App. 149, 164 S.E.2d 523 (1968).
8
,. Elmore v. Elmore, 4 N.C. App. 192, 166 S.E.2d 506 (1969).
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either present in this state or absent from it by reason of forceful seizure
by a parent or a third person. The rule is still the same. The court may
exercise jurisdiction if the child is present. This rule was strikingly
illustrated by In re Craigo."45 A mother and father with two small chil-
dren separated in late 1963. The mother and a man whom she later
married took the children to Reno, Nevada. The father and the maternal
grandparents went to Reno and brought the children to North Carolina
where they lived with the grandparents until July, 1964. The father then
took the children to his residence in Georgia, commenced a divorce action,
asked for custody of the children, and was awarded temporary custody
by a Georgia superior court order expressly indicating that it was not an
adjudication on the merits. Shortly thereafter the father learned that the
mother had obtained an absolute divorce in Florida and that the decree
contained no custody provision. The father took no further action in his
pending divorce action, married again, and settled on a farm near Ellijay,
Georgia. Nine days later the mother and her new husband went to the
home of the father and in his absence forcibly took the children and
brought them to North Carolina. Soon the maternal grandparents peti-
tioned for habeas corpus to have custody awarded to them. The father
intervened, contending that the Georgia custody decree was binding on
the North Carolina courts.
After holding that under the circumstances North Carolina courts
had jurisdiction over the children and the parents, the court rejected the
father's contention:
The constitutional provision, Article IV, Section 1, requiring
full faith and credit to be given to judicial proceedings in sister States
does not require North Carolina to treat as final and conclusive an
order of a sister State awarding custody of a minor when the Courts
of the State making the award can subsequently modify the order or
decree.246
The court cited authority to the effect that under Georgia law the prior
order was interlocutory. (It would seem that no custody decree ever
becomes final in the sense that it may not subsequently be altered upon
proof of change of material circumstances.) In Craigo, the court approved
the trial court's findings that the grandparents were proper custodians
because neither parent was suitable. It did not say whether there was
-1- 266 N.C. 92, 145 S.E.2d 376 (1965).
216 Id. at 95, 145 S.E.2d at 378.
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evidence of change of circumstance occurring subsequent to the Georgia
decree, nor whether findings to this effect were necessary to comply with
the full faith and credit clause.
If the child is absent from the state, even though bodily carried away,
and there is no in personam jurisdiction of the actual custodian, it has
been held that the court is without jurisdiction to award custody.24 7 It
has also been held that if both parents are before the court, it has juris-
diction even if the child is outside the state because the court may rely
on its in personam power.24 The true principle would seem to be that
only if the court has in personam jurisdiction over the actual custodian,
whether he be a parent or someone else, may it award custody of a child
who is outside the state.
The kidnapping of a child by a parent is not a criminal offense under
federal law249 and until 1969 was not a crime in North Carolina.25 These
circumstances and the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts when the
child is present put a premium on self-help and, in the words of Justice
Jackson, seems "to reduce the law of custody to a rule of seize-and-
run." 2 1 The countervailing factor is that if unfortunate children of broken
homes are present, courts from a sense of compassion seek to do whatever
seems to offer promise of improving the children's lot. As a North Caro-
lina court has said, "The polar star for determining the custody of chil-
dren is what serves the best interests of the children. '252 This attitude
even extends to the appellate court's disregarding the failure of counsel
either to docket the appeal on time or to file a brief and proceeding to
review the stenographic transcript of the custody hearing on the merits,
"because the duty is constant upon the courts to give to children subject to
their jurisdiction such oversight and control as will be conducive to the
welfare of the child and to the best interests of the State. 25
3
In 1969 the North Carolina General Assembly made it a felony, pun-
ishable by up to three years imprisonment, "for any person with the intent
to violate [the custody order of a North Carolina court] to take or trans-
"" Weddington v. Weddington, 243 N.C. 702, 92 S.E.2d 71 (1956).
"'
8Romano v. Romano, 266 N.C. 551, 146 S.E.2d 821 (1966) ; Weddington v.
Weddington, 243 N.C. 702, 92 S.E.2d 71 (1956); Speck v. Speck, 5 N.C. App.
296, 168 S.E.2d 672 (1969).
-18 U.S.C. 1201 (1964).
"' Compare N.C. Gnx. STAT. § 14-39 (1969) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-320.1
(1969).May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 542 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
In re Owenby, 3 N.C. App. 53, 54, 164 S.E.2d 55, 56 (1968).
's In re Burchette, 3 N.C. App. 575, 578, 165 S.E.2d 564, 566 (1969).
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port, or cause to be taken or transported, any such child from any point
within this State to any point outside the limits of this State or to keep
any such child outside the limits of this State." '254 This Act does not
apply to the forcible removal of a child from any other state in violation of
a custody order of a court of North Carolina or of any other state.
Thus, without violating the statute, a parent or his agent may still
forcibly bring a child into North Carolina in disobedience of an existing
custody award and then seek a North Carolina custody order. Moreover,
a parent may violate with penal impunity a North Carolnia custody decree
by abducting a child from any point in the state and taking him to any
other point in North Carolina. The removal of a child from North Caro-
lina before any domestic custody award has been made is not prohibited
even though a petition for custody is then pending. The penal statute
may have some deterrent effect, but it falls far short of prohibiting the
"rule of seize-and-run" in custody disputes.
A recent case from the court of appeals, Rothman v. Rothman,
26
concisely collects much of the learning applicable to interstate custody
disputes. Plaintiff wife and defendant husband were residents of Vir-
ginia in April 1969, when the husband obtained a valid Virginia divorce
from bed and board and temporary custody of an infant son. Both parties
had appeared personally. In March 1969, the wife obtained court per-
mission to leave Virginia temporarily and to take the infant with her to
her parents' home in North Carolina on condition that they return for a
scheduled hearing. The wife failed to return and was found in contempt,
and the Virginia court entered the divorce and custody decree. In early
May the husband came to North Carolina to claim the child and was
then served with the wife's North Carolina custody petition. The hus-
band countered with a North Carolina habeas corpus petition, and these
proceedings were consolidated. The district court after a hearing awarded
custody to the wife. The appellate court found that the evidence did not
support the finding of change of circumstances sufficient to warrant modi-
fying the Virginia decree, reversed, and upheld the father's custody in
accordance with the Virginia decree. The court held that (1) the
physical presence of the child gave the North Carolina court jurisdiction
to modify the Virginia decree; (2) the Virginia decree, though subject
to modification in Virginia, was entitled to full faith and credit in North
Carolina courts absent proof of subsequent change of circumstances with
.. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-320.1 (1969).
...6 N.C. App. 401, 170 S.E.2d 140 (1969).
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respect to custody; and (3) the doctrine of res judicata barred relitigation
of custody issues as they existed on the date of the Virginia decree.
A flexible approach to custody jurisdiction is certainly the order of
the day.256 A co-operative and child-welfare-centered exercise of custody
jurisdiction in multistate situations is reflected in the 1967 North Carolina
statutory provisions.257
"' See Sampsell v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948). Former
Chief Justice Traynor wrote:
There is, of course, no question that the courts of a particular state havejurisdiction to determine the child's custody if the court has jurisdiction in
personam over both parents, and the child is both physically present and
domiciled within the state .... All the basic elements in each of the fore-
going theories are present. Difficulties have been encountered, however,
when one or more of these elements are lacking.
• ..It would, however, be no solution of the problem to require all
these elements to be present before a court could acquire jurisdiction.
Unfortunately cases will arise where one or two elements are lacking, and
some court must have jurisdiction in the interest of the child to make
proper provision for its custody. . . . The principal cases and most of
the secondary authorities have been concerned less with the question whether
a court has jurisdiction than with the question whether the courts of other
states are bound by the particular decision, when that jurisdiction has been
exercised. The respective theories are based on the assumption that in
order to achieve finality in this matter one court at one given time must
have an exclusive right to determine the issue. "From a standpoint of
expediency and of achieving socially desirable ends, there seems to be only
one argument in favor of confining jurisdiction to a single state; that it
will produce stability and discourage the crossing of state lines to avoid the
effect of unpalatable custody decrees." . .. It is doubtful, however, whether
the best interest of the child, the paramount consideration in custody pro-
ceedings, is served thereby.
... In the interest of the child, there is no reason why the state where
the child is actually living may not have jurisdiction to act to protect the
child's welfare, and there is likewise no reason why other states should not
also have jurisdiction ....
Thus, if the child is living in one state but is domiciled in another, the
courts of both states may have jurisdiction over the question of its custody.
It does not follow, however, that the courts of both states will exercise
that jurisdiction and reach conflicting results. The courts of one state
may determine that the other state has a more substantial interest in the
child and leave the matter to be settled there. On the other hand, if the
jurisdiction of one state has been exercised over the child, there is no
reason why, if the welfare of the particular child is a matter of real con-
cern to the courts of another state, those courts may not also have juris-
diction, which might be exercised in the interest of the child "with re-
spectful consideration to the prior determination of other courts similarly
situated . .. ."
Id. at 777-80, 197 P.2d at 749-50.
.. The pertinent portions of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.5(c) (Supp. 1969)
read:
(5) If at any time a court of this State having jurisdiction of an action
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Separation Agreements
Under North Carolina statutory law2 s a separation agreement is void
if it does not contain a certificate by the certifying officer that he has made
a private examination of the wife. Even the wife may not assert the validity
of a separation agreement defective in this respect.2"0 The extraterritorial
effect of this statute was raised in Davis v. Davis,2' 0 which presented the
question of whether a separation agreement executed in Florida prior to
the wife's return to North Carolina to live is enforceable in this state
in the wife's action for alimony without divorce when the contract, though
valid under Florida law, did not comply with the North Carolina require-
ments. The trial court answered this question in the affirmative. The
or proceeding for the custody of a minor child finds as a fact that a court
in another state has assumed jurisdiction to determine the matter, and that
the best interests of the child and the parties would be served by having
the matter disposed of in that jurisdiction, the court of this State may,
in its discretion, refuse to exercise jurisdiction, and dismiss the action or
proceeding or may retain jurisdiction and enter such orders from time to
time as the interest of the child may require.
(6) If at any time a court of this State having jurisdiction of an action
or proceeding for the custody of a minor child finds as a fact that it would
not be in the best interests of the child, or that it would work substantial
injustice, for the action or proceeding to be tried in a court of this State,
and that jurisdiction to determine the matter has not been assumed by a
court in another state, the judge, on motion of any party, may enter an
order to stay further proceedings in the action in this State. A moving
party under this subdivision must stipulate his consent to suit in another
jurisdiction found by the judge to provide a convenient, reasonable and
fair place of trial. The court may retain jurisdiction of the matter for
such time and upon such terms as it provides in its order.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.7(b) (Supp. 1969) provides:
When an order for custody or support, or both, of a minor child has been
entered by a court of another state, a court of this State may, upon gaining
jurisdiction, and upon a showing of changed circumstances, enter a new
order for support or custody which modifies or supersedes such order for
custody or support.25 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6 (1966).
..
9 Trammell v. Trammell, 2 N.C. App. 166, 162 S.E.2d 605 (1968).
Defendant insists that the purported deed of separation is void for the
reason that the certifying officer did not provide in her certificate that the
plaintiff was privately examined; and being void, the trial court erred in
permitting it to be introduced in evidence.
. The purported deed of separation, without a certificate meeting the
requirements of G.S. 52-6 and G.S. 47-39, is void and, over defendant's
objection, should not have been allowed in evidence.
Id. at 168-69, 162 S.E.2d at 606-07.200269 N.C. 120, 152 S.E.2d 306 (1967).
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supreme court reversed and remanded with a number of interesting ob-
servations.
The court noted at the outset that since the agreement was signed
in Florida when plaintiff wife and defendant husband were both residents
there, its validity and construction were to be determined by the law of
Florida. The court applied the general rule that a contract is to be
construed according to the law of the place in which it is made. It then
recognized decisions dealing with contracts to be performed in another
state and holding that the law of the place of performance governs gen-
erally as to matters relating to performance. The court declined to follow
these cases, however, because it found no authority to apply the doctrine
to a separation agreement. Pointing out that while the agreement in
question implied that the wife intended to leave Florida, the court
observed that she was not required to do so.
It would seem that since the agreement was binding on plaintiff
under Florida law, her request for an increase in child support would
have to be denied. The court went on, however, to consider plaintiff's
contention that the agreement could not be enforced in this state, despite
its validity under the applicable law of Florida, because it violated North
Carolina's public policy. The court said that while an agreement like
the one at issue would not be rejected as void solely because of failure
to comply with the privy examination provision, it would be set aside
if it was factually established that it was unreasonable or injurious to
the wife. After noting that the burden of proof is on the party attacking
the validity of such agreement, the court remanded the case with the
following instructions:
If it be found as a fact upon competent evidence that the agreement
when executed was unreasonable or injurious to the wife, then it will
not be recognized as valid and enforceable in this state. If it be found
as a fact that it was not unreasonable or injurious to the wife, it
will be recognized as valid and enforceable as if in full compliance
with the North Carolina statute. The settled public policy of North
Carolina is concerned with substance rather than form.261
The court pointed out, as "worthy of exploration by counsel prior
to the next hearing," that Florida law permits modification of the amount
of payment for the support of the wife provided in a separation agree-
2 0. Id. at 126, 152 S.E.2d at 310.
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ment. It also noted that in North Carolina separation agreements are not
final as to the amount to be provided for the support and education of
minor children.
CONCLUSION
Many basic choice of law problems have arisen in North Carolina prac-
tice, have been adjudicated, and appear to be well-settled. Others, par-
ticularly those evolving from recent statutory enactments in the con-
flicts sphere, will necessitate the development of new jurisprudence. In
some of these areas the courts will have broad options of decision, and
imaginative advocacy may be rewarding. Considering the intricate phan-
tasmagoria that comprises the choice of law complex, it would be naive
to forecast dogmatically what the future action of either the courts or
the legislature may be. These problems lend themselves not so much to
immutable solutions as to pragmatic adjustments of clashing interests
in a constantly changing society.
